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This thesis is concerned with deficits in reasoning and language processing in autism. 
In everyday communication, there is a lot more required to understand an utterance 
than just combining word meanings and syntactic structure. That is, there is a distinc­
tion between the coded meaning and the speaker's meaning of an utterance. The 
coded meaning is determined by the semantic properties of a sentence assigned to 
it by syntax, whilst the speaker's meaning involves what the speaker actually intends 
to communicate. To retrieve the speaker's meaning, background knowledge and infer­
ences are involved too. For example, take the following situation. I have invited my 
friend for dinner at 7 o'clock. A t 6.45 my telephone rings. It is my friend and he says 
“ I have a flat tire ” . Because I know that my friend does not have a car, I will infer that 
it is my friend's bike that has a flat tire. Moreover, I might infer that his intention is 
to let me know that he will arrive later. Further, I reason that if he is late, it will be 
better to turn off the oven, otherwise the meal might burn. However, I will withdraw 
this inference if he tells me that he will take a bus. Such inferences are pervasive in 
everyday communication, and are the topic of this thesis. In particular, the focus is 
on inferences that are defeasible, i.e. inferences that can be withdrawn in the light of 
further information.
Research in semantics and pragmatics has demonstrated that there are many 
different kinds of defeasible inferences. In this thesis the focus will be on two types of 
defeasible inferences: scalar implicatures and conditional inferences. We are particu­
larly interested in the interpretive processes involved in these inferences. In the 
remainder of this chapter, we will first briefly introduce both kinds of defeasible 
inference. After that, we will discuss the key issues concerning autism, and why we 
expected people with autism to have problems with defeasible inferences. Next, we 
will discuss the research methods we used, and sketch the aims and the outline of 
this thesis.
Scalar implicatures
Scalar implicatures are inferences that go beyond the explicit meaning of an utter­
ance. Central to scalar implicatures is how people interpret terms such as some and 
or. For example, if a speaker utters “ Some students passed the exam” , one may derive 
that “ Not all students passed the exam” , though the speaker did not explicitly say 
so. The inference that “ Not all students passed the exam” has been dubbed a scalar 
implicature, and is due to pragmatic factors (Grice, 1975; Horn, 1972). Here pragmat­
ics refers to the implicit assumption that if the speaker had known that all students 
passed the exam, he would have said so. However, this inference is defeasible, for 
it can be withdrawn without inconsistency: “ Some, and perhaps even all students 
passed the exam” . In chapter 2 scalar implicatures are introduced more elaborately.
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Conditional inferences
Conditional inferences are of the type “ If P, then Q ” . There are four argument forms: 
modus ponens, modus tollens, affirmation of the consequent, and denial of the ante­
cedent (see Table 1.1). In classical logic, only modus ponens and modus tollens are 
considered valid. On the other hand, neither affirmation of the consequent nor denial 
of the antecedent lead to valid conclusions according to classical logic. They are 
explained as resulting from pragmatic processes, and are called invited inferences 
(Geis & Zwicky, 1971; Horn, 2000).
Inference Example
MP If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
modus ponens Mary has an exam
Mary w ill study in the library
MT If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
modus tollens Mary w ill not study in the library
Mary does not have an exam
AC If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
affirmation o f the consequent Mary w ill study in the library
Mary has an exam
DA If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
denial o f the antecedent Mary does not have an exam
Mary w ill not study in the library
Table 1.1 Examples o f the four argument forms.
It is well-known that conditionals give rise to defeasible inferences. Several 
experimental studies have shown that modus ponens and modus tollens can be 
suppressed in the light of extra information (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2002; Byrne, 1989; 
Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Chan & Chua, 1994; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & 
Rist, 1991; Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyens, & d'Ydewalle, 2000; Politzer & Bourmaud, 
2002). For example:
1. a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
b. If the library is open, Mary will study in the library
c. Mary has an exam
d. W ill Mary study in the library?
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This reasoning problem was presented with and without premise (1b). As soon as the 
extra premise (1b) came in, the number of people concluding that Mary will study in 
the library dropped to about 50%, whereas without the extra premise most people 
accepted the conclusion (Byrne et al., 1999). Hence, the addition of the extra premise 
(1b) leads to a significant decrease in the acceptance of a valid inference. The other 
two conditional inferences, affirmation of the consequent and denial of the anteced­
ent can be suppressed in a slightly different way, namely by providing information 
about alternatives, e.g.:
2. a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
b. If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library
c. Mary will study in the library
d. Does Mary have an exam?
Alternative premises like (2b) can suppress invited inferences, because an alternative 
reason for studying in the library is introduced. The effect of alternative premises 
on invited inferences was already shown by Rumain, Connell and Braine (1983) who 
found that both adults and children made fewer invited inferences when alternative 
antecedents were provided. Both examples (1) and (2) clearly illustrate that condi­
tional reasoning is defeasible: Extra information can affect a conditional inference.
A utism  spectrum  disorders (A S D )
Autism is a developmental disorder, characterized by deficits in three domains: 
impaired social interaction, impaired verbal and nonverbal communication, and 
restricted and repetitive interests and activities (DSM-IV, 1994). In line with the clini­
cal observation of the great variability of symptoms in autism, autism is generally 
viewed as a spectrum (hence “ autism spectrum disorders” or ASD), which includes 
individuals at all levels of intelligence and language ability, and covering all degrees 
of severity of the core symptoms. Within ASD five subtypes are distinguished: autis­
tic disorder, Asperger syndrome, pervasive developmental disorder - not otherwise 
specified (PDD-NOS), childhood disintegrative disorder, and Rett syndrome. The last 
two subtypes are both rather rare conditions characterized by an apparently normal 
development, after which development is disrupted by a regression in skills. We will 
no further consider these two rare subtypes in the remainder of this thesis. The 
criteria fo r autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome as specified by DSM-IV are 
listed in box 1.1 and 1.2.
In terms of the DSM-IV criteria, the key distinction between autistic disorder and 
Asperger syndrome is that individuals with Asperger syndrome do not demonstrate 
any delays in language development, as is apparent from the use of first words by
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DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder
A. A  total o f at least six items from (1), (2), and (3), w ith  at least tw o  from (1), and 
one from (2) and from (3):
(1) Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least tw o  o f the 
following:
a. marked impairment in the use o f multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to-eye 
gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to  regulate social interaction
b. failure to  develop peer relationships appropriate to  developmental level
c. lack o f spontaneous seeking to  share enjoyment, interests, o r  achievements w ith 
o ther people (e.g., by a lack o f showing, bringing, o r pointing ou t objects o f interest)
d. lack o f social o r  emotional reciprocity
(2) Qualitative impairments in communication as manifested by at least one o f the 
following:
a. delay in o r  to ta l lack of, the development o f spoken language (not accompanied by 
an attempt to  compensate through alternative modes o f communication such as 
gestures o r mimes)
b. in individuals w ith adequate speech, marked impairment in the ability to  initiate o r 
sustain a conversation w ith  others
c. stereotyped and repetitive use o f language o r idiosyncratic language
d. lack o f varied spontaneous make-believe play o r social imitative play appropriate to  
developmental level
(3) Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns o f behavior, interests and activities, 
as manifested by at least one o f the following:
a. encompassing preoccupation w ith one o r more stereotyped and restricted patterns 
o f interest that is abnormal either in intensity o r focus
b. apparently inflexible adherence to  specific, nonfunctional routines o r rituals
c. stereotyped and repetitive m oto r mannerisms (e.g. hand o r finger flapping o r 
twisting, o r  complex whole body movements)
d. persistent preoccupation w ith  parts o f objects
B. Delays o r abnormal functioning in at least one o f the following areas, w ith  onset 
p rio r to  the age o f three:
(1) social interaction, (2) language used in social interaction, o r  (3) symbolic o r 
imaginative play
C. N o t better accounted fo r by Rett's D isorder o r Childhood Disintegrative D isorder
Box 1.1 From Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 4th edition, by 
American Psychiatric Association 1994, Washington DC.
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DSM-IV criteria for Asperger syndrome
A. Qualitative impairment in social interaction, as manifested by at least tw o  o f the 
following:
a. marked impairment in the use o f multiple nonverbal behaviors such as eye-to eye 
gaze, facial expression, body postures, and gestures to  regulate social interaction
b. failure to  develop peer relationships appropriate to  developmental level
c. a lack o f spontaneous seeking to  share enjoyment, interests, o r  achievements w ith 
o ther people (e.g., by a lack o f showing, bringing, o r pointing ou t objects o f interest 
to  o ther people)
d. lack o f social o r  emotional reciprocity
B. Restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns o f behavior, interests and activities, 
as manifested by at least one o f the following:
a. encompassing preoccupation w ith  one o r more stereotyped and restricted 
patterns o f interest tha t is abnormal either in intensity o f focus
b. apparently inflexible adherence to  specific, nonfunctional routines o r rituals
c. stereotyped and repetitive m oto r mannerisms (e.g., hand o r finger flapping o r 
twisting, o r  complex whole-body movements)
d. persistent preoccupation w ith  parts o f objects
C. The disturbance causes clinically significant impairment in social, occupational, o r 
o ther im portant areas o f functioning
D. There is no clinically significant general delay in language (e.g., single words used 
by age 2 years, communicative phrases used by age 3 years)
E. There is no clinically significant delay in cognitive development o r in the 
development o f age-appropriate self-help skills, adaptive behavior (o ther than 
in social interaction), and curiosity about the environment in childhood
F. C riteria are not met fo r another specific Pervasive Developmental D isorder o r 
Schizophrenia
Box 1.2 From Diagnostic and Statistical Manual o f Mental Disorders, 4th edition, by 
American Psychiatric Association 1994, Washington DC.
the age of two and of phrases by the age of three years (DSM-IV, 1994). PDD-NOS 
is characterized by the same symptoms as autistic disorder, but these symptoms 
are sub-threshold, and do not meet the full set of criteria for autistic disorder as 
specified by DSM-IV. In this thesis, we will report on three experiments that included 
adults with autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome, but not PDD-NOS. We will use 
the term “ high-functioning” for those who have IQ scores of 85 or above, although 
the term itself is not part of DSM-IV criteria. In the whole thesis, we use the terms 
ASD and autism interchangeably. Besides, we apply the terms high-functioning autistic 
disorder (HFA) and Asperger syndrome to refer to the specific subgroups of ASD 
that we examined in our research.
Since autism was first described by Leo Kanner (1943), and by Hans Asperger 
(1944), many theories about its etiology have been proposed. However, it took more 
than 20 years before the cognitive aspects of autism became a topic of investigation. 
There are three main cognitive accounts that attempt to explain the typical behav­
iors that are seen in autism: theory of mind, weak central coherence, and executive 
functions. Although these accounts are often presented as alternatives, there is no 
conceptual or empirical basis for that they are mutually exclusive. Quite the contrary, 
recent work underlines that we should abandon the attempt to find a single cogni­
tive explanation for the diverse symptoms defining autism (Happé, Ronald, & Plomin, 
2006b; Pellicano, Maybery, Durkin, & Maley, 2006; Rajendran & Mitchell, 2007). In the 
following, we will briefly outline the three cognitive accounts.
Theory of mind account
Theory of mind is the ability to attribute mental states - beliefs, intentions, feelings, 
desires, etc. - as part of the process of interpreting and predicting other people's 
behavior. A  large number of studies have demonstrated that children with autism 
have difficulties with understanding that other people can have beliefs that are differ­
ent from their own (for a review, see Baron-Cohen, 2001). One task that has been 
designed to investigate theory of mind in autism, is the Sally-Anne test - a so called 
false-belief test (Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). In this test, there are two dolls 
Sally and Anne. Sally has a basket in which she puts a marble. While Sally is away, 
Anne takes out Sally's marble and puts it into her own box. When Sally returns, she 
wants to play with the marble. A t that point, the child is asked the critical question: 
“Where will Sally look for the marble?” . Remarkably, 80% of the children with autism 
pointed to the box, whereas younger children and children with Down syndrome 
gave the correct answer that Sally will look in the basket. A t the same time, all chil­
dren correctly answered the control questions about where the marble really is and 
where the marble was at first. Thus the children with autism failed to understand that 
Sally has a false belief about the location of the marble.
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Although the theory of mind account is able to explain deficits in social interac­
tion and communication, it cannot account for other aspects of autism, such as rigid 
behavior and narrow interests. Moreover, theory of mind deficits do not appear to 
be universal in autism, as it has been shown that a proportion of children with autism 
were able to pass false-belief tests, and even higher-order theory of mind tests, such 
as understanding beliefs about beliefs, e.g. “ Mary thinks that John thinks that ...” 
(Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Bowler, 1992; Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, 
& van der Gaag, 1999a; Dahlgren & Trillingsgaard, 1996; Happé, 1995a). Furthermore, 
several studies have shown that performance on false-belief tests is also related to 
other factors, such as verbal abilities and intelligence (Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab- 
Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999b; Happé, 1995a).
Weak central coherence account
Central coherence refers to the everyday tendency to process incoming informa­
tion for meaning, which has been proposed to be weak in autism (Frith, 1989/2003). 
It has been suggested that people with autism have a cognitive style that is biased 
towards local rather than global information processing (Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 
2006a). That is, they tend to focus on the details at the expense of the global picture. 
Evidence for detail-focused processing has been found in various visuo-spatial tasks, 
including superior performance on the Wechsler Block Design task and the Embed­
ded Figures Test (for a review, see Happé et al., 2006a). On the other hand, evidence 
for reduced global processing have been found in several studies that investigated the 
processing of linguistic information in context (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). Recently, Happé and Booth (2008) have argued that 
weak central coherence may be separable into two possibly independent compo­
nents: enhanced local processing and reduced global processing.
Executive functions account
“ Executive function” is an umbrella term covering a range of higher-level capacities 
such as initiation, planning and monitoring of behavior, holding information on-line in 
working memory, inhibition of responses, and cognitive flexibility or set-shifting (Hill, 
2004; Ozonoff, 1995a; Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996). Executive functions are thought 
to be regulated by the frontal lobes, though evidence is inconsistent (for a review, 
see Alvarez & Emory, 2006). People with autism have been found to show execu­
tive dysfunction on a number of tasks (Hill, 2004; Russell, 1997). Although executive 
impairments are considered to be a core component in autism, they are not unique 
to autism and are also seen in a variety of other psychiatric disorders such as ADHD, 
Tourette's syndrome and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Ozonoff, 1997). Research 
aiming to specify which executive functions are in particular affected in autism point
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to  deficits especially in planning and cognitive flexibility (Geurts, Verte, Oosterlaan, 
Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; Ozonoff, 1997; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999)
Language, pragmatics and inferences in autism
Of particular interest for this thesis are the impairments in pragmatic skills that 
are seen in autism. Over the past decades, research on ASD has shown that prag­
matic impairments are widespread in ASD (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Tager-Flusberg, 1981; 
1999b; Tager-Flusberg, Paul, & Lord, 2005). Pragmatic impairments are found both 
in children and adults with ASD, and include difficulties in understanding non-lit­
eral language like irony and metaphors (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001; Happé, 
1993; Martin & McDonald, 2004; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996). However, the basic aspects 
of language (syntax, semantics, phonology) appear to be relatively intact in high- 
functioning people with ASD (Minshew, Goldstein, & Siegel, 1995), though other 
research indicates mild to moderate impairments (Kjelgaard, 2001; Tager-Flusberg, 
2006). Impairments in pragmatics in ASD are usually explained by an impaired theory 
of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Tager-Flusberg, 1999a; b), because pragmatics requires 
some sensitivity to the mental states of speaker and listener. However, Baron-Cohen 
(2001) underlines that pragmatic impairments could occur for at least two reasons: 
some degree of impaired theory of mind, or some degree of impaired use of context 
due to weak central coherence.
Despite the considerable amount of literature on pragmatic deficits in ASD, there 
is a paucity of research on the ability to make inferences. Most research has focused 
on theory of mind reasoning, which involves the ability to infer other people's beliefs, 
intentions etc. Research examining pragmatic inferences in ASD mainly involved 
bridging inferences and global inferences required for text interpretation (Dennis 
et al., 2001; Jolliffe et al., 1999; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000). People with ASD were 
found to be less able to use contextual information to make a global inference in a 
sentence arrangement task, and were less likely to choose a bridging inference to 
make a scenario coherent if they had to select from a list of alternatives (Jolliffe et 
al., 1999; 2000). However, Saldana and Frith (2007) demonstrated that people with 
ASD showed a similar priming effect as controls for questions that were related to an 
implicit bridging inference, which suggest that they were able to make implicit infer­
ences during reading.
In this thesis we will explore defeasible inferences in adults with autism, which 
is an unexplored area of research in autism. We expected people with autism to 
have problems with defeasible inferences for at least two reasons. First, defeasible 
inferences like scalar implicatures go beyond the literal meaning of the words. It 
is well-known that people with ASD tend to interpret non-literal language literally 
(Dennis et al., 2001; Happé, 1993; 1995b), which suggest that people with autism
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might have difficulty deriving scalar implicatures. Second, defeasibility also implies that 
one should revise earlier conclusions or interpretations when the situation changes, 
which requires a mental flexibility that is often impaired in autism (Geurts et al., 2004; 
Hill, 2004; Ozonoff et al., 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1996; Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & 
Filloux, 1994)
Finally, up to now it is still a matter of debate whether Asperger syndrome is 
a variant of high-functioning autism, or is a distinct and separate disorder (Frith, 
2004; Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004; Matson & Wilkins, 2007). Autistic disorder and 
Asperger syndrome are characterized by similar features but differ in early language 
profile. More specifically, Asperger syndrome is differentiated from autistic disorder 
by an absence of clinically significant delays in early cognitive functioning and early 
language development, in particular the onset of the production of the first words 
and phrases (DSM-IV, 1994, see also box 1.1 and 1.2). Because adults with HFA and 
Asperger syndrome may differ in the way they process linguistic information, we will 
also explore whether these subgroups differ in the way they deal with defeasible 
inferences.
Research methods
In this thesis we will report on four experiments. Chapters 2 and 3 describe two 
behavioral experiments, in which participants were presented with linguistic stimuli 
on a computer screen while responses and response times were recorded. Chapter 
4 and 5 report on two experiments that used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) 
to make reasoning and linguistic processes visible. We will briefly describe the ERP 
technique below. For an extensive introduction on ERPs, we refer the reader to Luck 
(2005), and to Kutas and Van Petten (1994) for the application of ERPs in psycholin- 
guistic research.
Event-related brain potentials (ERPs)
Electroencephalograms (EEG) record voltage fluctuations in the brain using elec­
trodes attached at various locations at the surface of the scalp. These voltage fluc­
tuations are produced by large groups of neurons, which are active synchronously 
and oriented in the same direction such that their effects accumulate at the scalp. 
Because the voltage fluctuations are very small, they are amplified before recording. 
ERPs differ from spontaneous EEG in that they reflect electrical activity of the brain 
that is time-locked to a particular cognitive event, such as reading a word. Because 
ERPs are much smaller than spontaneous EEG, - a few microvolts for ERPs compared 
to about 50-100 microvolts for spontaneous EEG - , they are not visible in the spon­
taneous EEG. A  common technique to extract the ERP from the spontaneous EEG is 
to average EEG activity over a large number of trials with similar stimuli (see Figure 
1.1 for an illustration of the procedure).
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ongoing EEG
— ► amplifier — ►
onset sentence onset “ tulip”
I
signal averaging
“ Finally the climbers reached the top of the tulip’’
Figure 1.1 The participant wearing an electrode cap 
was presented with visual stimuli, e.g. sentences like 
“ Finally the climbers reached the top of the tulip” . 
The waveform of one electrode (Cz) is displayed. 
Because the ERP is too small to  be detected in the 
ongoing EEG, averaging about a large number of 
stimulus presentationsis required to  achieve an 
adequate signal-to-noise ratio. The ERPs were 
time-locked to the onset of the final word of each 
sentence that was presented. Negative voltages are 
plotted upwards.
I
ERP
-100 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800 900 [ms]
The idea behind the averaging procedure is that those aspects of the EEG that are 
not time-locked to the event vary randomly from trial to trial, and will be cancelled 
out when averaging over a large number of trials. Hence, averaging improves the 
signal-to-noise ratio of the ERP relative to the spontaneous EEG. In psycholinguistic 
research, a minimum of 25 trials per condition is usually recommended to provide a 
good signal-to-noise ratio (Kutas et al., 1994).
The averaged ERP waveform includes a series of positive and negative peaks, 
which are usually referred to as ERP components. It is good to notice that ERPs 
do not reflect absolute voltages, but always reflect differences in potential between 
the electrode site at which the ERPs are recorded and a reference electrode that is 
assumed not to record any neural activity, e.g. the mastoid bone behind the ear. The 
labels given to ERP components usually include the polarity, latency and amplitude 
of the component. For instance, the N400 refers to a negative going voltage deflec­
tion with a peak latency around 400 ms. W ithin ERP components, a distinction can 
be made between exogenous and endogenous components. The first occur relatively 
early after stimulus onset (within 100 ms), and are mainly evoked by physical stimulus 
characteristics, but are relatively insensitive to cognitive processes. In contrast, the 
later components - the so called endogenous components - are influenced more 
by the nature of interaction between the participant and the event, such as task
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demands, participants' decisions etc. For research on cognitive processing the endog­
enous components are of most interest, as they reflect cognitive aspects of stimulus 
processing.
It is important to distinguish between an ERP component and an ERP effect. An 
ERP effect is the amplitude difference between two different experimental condi­
tions within a certain time interval. For instance, every content word elicits an N400 
component in the latency range from 250-500 ms, but this component can be modu­
lated by an experimental manipulation of congruency. Words that are semantically 
incongruent with the prior sentence context (“ Finally the climbers reached the top 
of the tulip”) elicit a larger N400 component than semantically congruent words 
(“ Finally the climbers reached the top of the mountain”). The difference in N400 
amplitude between the experimental conditions is called the N400 effect. ERP effects 
between experimental conditions can inform us about the modulation of an under­
lying cognitive process. In particular, the time at which the ERP waveforms of the 
experimental conditions start diverging can be seen as an upper bound for estimating 
the moment at which the processing difference occurred. Moreover, one can examine 
the scalp distribution or topography of the ERP effect, which reveals the electrodes 
at which the ERP effect is maximal.
The ERPs method has several strengths: ERPs are non-invasive, have a tempo­
ral resolution in the order of milliseconds, and can be recorded without additional 
tasks. One weakness of ERPs is that not all neural processes underlying cognitive 
functions are reflected in the ERP, because the EEG can only pick up neural activity 
of groups of neurons that are active synchronously and oriented in the same direc­
tion. Neural activity from neurons that have another configuration is not recorded. 
Another disadvantage is that the spatial resolution of ERPs is rather poor, because 
the electrical signal is smeared out over the conductive skull. Therefore it is very 
hard to establish from which part of the brain the neural activity originated. This 
also implies that potentials that are recorded at a particular scalp location do not 
necessarily reflect neural activity in the underlying cortical area. To derive the source 
localization of a cognitive process, other neuro-imaging techniques such as MEG and 
fMRI may be used.
Aim s and outline
The main aim of this thesis is to explore how high-functioning adults with ASD deal 
with defeasible inferences, compared to matched controls. In particular, we are inter­
ested in the interpretive processes involved in defeasible inference. The focus will be 
on two types of defeasible inference: scalar implicatures and conditional inferences. 
Another issue that we will examine is possible difference between two subgroups 
within ASD: autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome. Because these conditions differ
in early language profile, we will examine whether people with autistic disorder and 
Asperger syndrome differ in understanding defeasible inferences.
The outline of this thesis is as follows. In chapter 2 we examine whether high- 
functioning adults with ASD are capable of deriving scalar implicatures from the scalar 
terms some and or.We will also look at the role of linguistic abilities in the interpre­
tation of these scalar terms. In chapter 3, we describe the suppression task, which 
is a good tool to investigate how people deal with defeasible inferences. We investi­
gated both conditional inferences and the suppression of these inferences in adults 
with and without ASD. In chapter 4, we introduce a paradigm that we developed to 
investigate defeasible inferences using ERPs, which we tested in a group of students. 
Chapter 5 reports how we employed this paradigm to study high-functioning adults 
with ASD. Finally, chapter 6 provides a summary of the main findings of this thesis and 
some conclusions. Note that each chapter was written as a separate article. Hence, 
each chapter can be read independently from the others.
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chapter 2
Pragmatic inferences in high-functioning adults 
with autism and Asperger syndrome
22 c h a p te r  2
Abstract
Although people with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) often have severe problems 
with pragmatic aspects of language, little is known about their pragmatic reasoning. 
We carried out a behavioral study on high-functioning adults with autistic disorder 
(n = ii) , with Asperger syndrome (n=!7), and matched controls (n=28) to investigate 
whether they are capable of deriving scalar implicatures, which are generally consid­
ered to be pragmatic inferences. Participants were presented with underinforma- 
tive sentences like “ Some sparrows are birds” . This sentence is logically true, but 
pragmatically inappropriate if the scalar implicature “ Not all sparrows are birds” is 
derived.The present findings indicate that the combined ASD group was just as likely 
as controls to derive scalar implicatures, yet there was a difference between partici­
pants with autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome, suggesting a potential differenti­
ation between these disorders in pragmatic reasoning. Moreover, our results suggest 
that verbal intelligence is a constraint for task performance in autistic disorder but 
not in Asperger syndrome.
This chapter has been based on: Pijnacker, J., Hagoort, P., Buitelaar, J.K.,Teunisse, J-P, 
Geurts, B. (2009). Pragmatic inferences in high-functioning adults with autism and Asperger 
syndrome, Journal of autism and developmental disorders 39 (4), 607-618.
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Introduction
In everyday discourse, the meaning of an utterance usually goes beyond its explicit 
linguistic meaning. For example, consider the following dialogue:
a. A: Would you like some chicken soup?
b. B: I am a vegetarian.
B's answer seems irrelevant, unless a pragmatic inference is made. In order to under­
stand her reply, one must infer that vegetarians do not eat chicken, and therefore she 
does not want to have chicken soup. This inference is a pragmatic one, because it is 
not entailed by the literal content of B's utterance.
Over the past decades, research on autism spectrum disorders (ASD) has shown 
that pragmatic impairments are widespread in ASD. Pragmatic impairments are found 
in both children and adults with autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome, whereas 
formal language deficits (i.e. deficits in syntax, semantics, phonology) are not defin­
ing features of ASD (DSM-IV, 1994) and show a wide variability among persons with 
ASD (Kjelgaard & Tager-Flusberg, 200!; Tager-Flusberg, 2006). In this paper, we focus 
on high-functioning ASD, that is, ASD without intellectual disability, usually defined as 
having an intelligence of 85 or above. Research indicates that high-functioning people 
with ASD usually have relatively intact core language features (Minshew, Goldstein, & 
Siegel, 1995), although others suggest mild to moderate impairments (see also over­
views by Boucher, 2003; Walenski, Tager-Flusberg, & Ullman, 2006). What is univer­
sal in ASD are severe problems with pragmatic aspects of language (Baron-Cohen, 
1988; Boucher, 2003; Eales, 1993; Martin & McDonald, 2003; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996; 
Tager-Flusberg, 1981, 1996) as is shown, for example, by inappropriate turn-taking 
in conversations, abnormal prosody, inability to adjust to the communicative setting 
(e.g. impoliteness, embarrassing questions, pedantic speech), and difficulties in differ­
entiating between old and new information. Furthermore, difficulties in understand­
ing non-literal language have been observed. People with ASD tend to interpret irony 
and metaphors literally and have difficulty understanding humor (Dennis, Lazenby, & 
Lockyer, 200!; Emerich, Creaghead, Grether, Murray, & Grasha, 2003; Happé, 1993, 
1995; Martin & McDonald, 2004).
Despite the considerable amount of literature on pragmatics in ASD, there is 
a paucity of research on pragmatic reasoning, that is, the ability to make inferences 
that go beyond the linguistic meaning of utterances. Studies that have examined prag­
matic inferences in ASD have focused on bridging inferences and global inferences 
required for text interpretation (Dennis et al., 200!; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 
2000). People with ASD were found to be less able to use contextual information 
to make a global inference in a sentence arrangement task, and were less likely to
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choose a bridging inference to make a scenario coherent if they had to select from 
a list of alternatives (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000). However, Saldana and Frith 
(2007) These findings indicate that people with autism have difficulty understanding 
language in context, and it has been argued that these findings support the weak 
central coherence account of ASD. The weak central coherence account claims that 
people with ASD have a processing bias for details at the expense of the global 
picture (Frith, 2003; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 2006). Evidence for this pattern has 
been found in various visual tasks (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2001), as well as in linguis­
tic tasks (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000). For example, in a homograph 
task, in which the correct pronunciation of a word was determined by the preceding 
sentence, participants with ASD failed to use the correct pronunciation and thus 
presumably did not fully integrate linguistic information in context (Frith & Snowling, 
1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). For instance, they failed to use the 
sentence context when pronouncing the homograph tear in a sentence like “ In her 
dress/eye there was a big tear” .
However, pragmatic impairments in ASD are usually explained by an impaired 
theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1988; Tager-Flusberg, 1999a, 1999b). Theory of mind 
refers to the ability to attribute mental states like intentions, beliefs, and desires to 
oneself and other people as a means to predict and understand behavior (Baron­
Cohen, 1995, 2001). Happé (1993) found that there is a close link between pragmatic 
skills and theory of mind abilities. She found that performance on theory of mind 
tasks was a good predictor of understanding of non-literal uses of language like meta­
phors and irony.
In this paper we report on a behavioral experiment that examined a class of prag­
matic inferences in high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (HFA) and Asperger 
syndrome. The focus of this study was on scalar implicatures, which are generally 
considered to be pragmatic inferences. Central to scalar implicatures is how people 
interpret terms such as some and or, which are very common in everyday language. 
Before we discuss the experiment, we will provide an overview of recent experimen­
tal and developmental research on implicatures and some theoretical background.
Scalar implicatures
As illustrated above in (a, b), in everyday conversation, the meaning of an utterance is 
determined not only by its literal content, but also by pragmatic factors. These prag­
matic factors are responsible for certain inferences. One type of inference in which 
pragmatic factors play a role are scalar inferences. Consider the following dialogues:
c. A: Did all students pass the exam?
d. B: Some of them did.
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e. A: Does John own any pets?
f. B: He owns a cat or a dog.
Although speaker B did not explicitly say so, most people will understand his utter­
ances as:
g. Some but not all students passed the exam.
h. John owns a cat or a dog but not both.
(g) and (h) are inferences that are known as scalar implicatures. The added compo­
nents but not all and but not both are not part of the literal content of (d) and (f), 
but are inferences that arise from certain conversational principles. Following Grice 
(1975), conversation is driven by a cooperative principle, stating that speakers expect 
each other to make a “ conversational contribution such as is required, at the stage at 
which it occurs, by the accepted purpose or direction of the talk exchange” (Grice, 
1975, p.45). This cooperative principle is further elaborated as a set of maxims. Impli­
catures like (g) and (h) are usually explained by reference to the maxim of quantity. 
This maxim enjoins the speaker to make his contribution as informative as is required 
for the purpose of conversation.
People interpret (d) as (g), and (f) as (h), because linguistic expressions like some 
and or are ordered in scales of informativeness (Horn, 1972). For instance, the expres­
sions some and or are associated with the following scales:
i. <some, many, all> 
j. <or, and>
Other scales are for instance <may, should, must>, <sometimes, often, always>, and 
<possibly, necessary>. Typically, the elements of the scale are ordered by entailment 
relations. Elements on the right side of the scale are informationally stronger, and 
therefore logically entail the weaker ones. Thus the expression some is weaker than 
all, because all logically entails some but not vice versa. Assuming that the speaker is 
obeying the maxim of quantity, the use of a weaker term like some implies that the 
stronger forms of the scale (i.e. many, all) do not apply; otherwise the speaker would 
have used one of these stronger forms instead. Hence, if the speaker had known that 
all students passed the exams, he would have said so, assuming that he speaker is well 
informed and being cooperative. This type of reasoning requires one to reason about 
other people's beliefs, because the listener has to take into account what the speaker 
might have said but did not. Thus the computation of scalar implicatures requires 
some form of ‘mindreading', i.e. the attribution of intentions and beliefs to others. It is
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precisely reasoning about other people's minds that people with ASD often find hard 
to do because of an impaired theory of mind (Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2001).
Though the prevailing view is that scalar implicatures are pragmatic inferences, in 
which at least some form of reasoning about other people's minds is involved, there 
are competing approaches that do not postulate any form of ‘mindreading' in the 
derivation of scalar implicatures. Levinson (2000), for example, advocates a default 
approach. He argues that scalar implicatures are default inferences that are prompted 
automatically by scalar expressions. Only at a later stage, when the context is taken 
into consideration, are the default inferences possibly cancelled. Likewise, Chierchia 
(2004) proposes that scalar inferences are always triggered unless they are inhibited 
by certain syntactic constraints. However, there are good reasons for doubting that 
these views are on the right track (Geurts, 2009).
Despite a considerable amount of theoretical literature on scalar implicatures, 
it is less clear as to how they are processed. In the following discussion, we review 
some experimental studies on scalar implicatures. Recent experimental work on chil­
dren's interpretation of scalar expressions has shown that young children are more 
logical (i.e. non-pragmatic or literal) than adults, which is to say, children derive fewer 
implicatures than adults do (Noveck, 2001). When presented with underinformative 
sentences like “ Some giraffes have long necks” , 89% of the children in Noveck's study 
answered that this statement is true (= logical/literal interpretation), while only 41% 
of the adults responded true. Other developmental studies have confirmed the find­
ing that children do not derive scalar implicatures to the same extent as adults do, 
even when given more explicit instructions, a training session or acting out tasks that 
do not require real world knowledge and which are easier for children (Guasti, Chier­
chia, Foppolo, Gualmini, & Meroni, 2005; Papafragou & Musolino, 2003; Pouscoulous, 
Noveck, Politzer, & Bastide, 2007). The finding that children's performance improved 
when manipulating experimental conditions, suggests that it is not merely pragmatic 
competence as such that is lacking in children, and that limited cognitive resources 
may be part of the explanation.
That the computation of implicatures requires effortful processing has been 
shown by studies using reaction times. Bott and Noveck (2004), for example, found 
that participants needed significantly more time to give pragmatic responses (‘false'), 
as compared to logical responses (‘true'), when presented with underinformative 
statements like “ Some elephants are mammals” . In another experiment, they found 
that the number of logical responses increased when participants had less time to 
respond.These findings indicate that the computation of implicatures is effortful. Also, 
Breheny, Katsos and Williams (2006) found in reading time experiments that process­
ing an implicature took more time than processing the logical meaning of a scalar 
expression. All of these results point to an effortful process to arrive at the pragmatic
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interpretation of a scalar term and suggest that scalar inferences are not derived by 
default, as proposed by Levinson (2000) and Chierchia (2004).
The main purpose of this article is to investigate whether high-functioning adults 
with ASD are capable of deriving scalar implicatures. From the perspective of autism 
research, implicatures are interesting in more than one way. First, it is well known 
that people with ASD often have problems with pragmatic aspects of language. 
Most importantly, pragmatic interpretation involves the attribution of intentions 
and beliefs to other people. As described above, deriving an implicature presumably 
requires one to reason about what a speaker knows and what he might have said but 
did not. In other words, it requires reasoning about other people's beliefs, and it is 
precisely this ‘mindreading' that has been shown to be difficult for people with ASD 
(Baron-Cohen, 1995, 2001). Second, people with ASD tend to interpret non-literal 
language like metaphors, idioms and irony literally (Dennis et al., 2001; Happé, 1993, 
1995). For these reasons, we expect adults with ASD to interpret underinformative 
sentences more often logically (i.e. literally) than matched controls. A  second aim 
of this paper is to explore how people with ASD process implicatures by assessing 
reading times and linguistic abilities. Finally, we will take into account the distinction 
between Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism (HFA). Although people 
with Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autistic disorder are characterized by 
similar features and both are likely to be of average or above average intelligence, 
Asperger syndrome is differentiated from autistic disorder by an absence of clinically 
significant delays in early cognitive functioning and early language development, in 
particular the production of first words by the age of two and of phrases by the age 
of three (DSM-IV, 1994). It is still an issue of debate whether Asperger syndrome is a 
variant of high-functioning autism or is a distinct and separate disorder (Frith, 2004; 
Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004). Because Asperger syndrome and autistic disorder 
differ in language development profile, we will consider these conditions separately. 
Moreover, this study offers an opportunity to look at these conditions using measures 
independent of diagnostic criteria.
Methods
Participants
Participants in this study included 28 high-functioning adults with ASD (autistic disor­
der (HFA), n= i i  and Asperger syndrome, n=l7) and 28 matched controls, aged 18 to 
40 years. Both groups consisted of 20 male and 8 female subjects. The groups were 
matched for handedness, with 24 right-handed and 4 left-handed participants in each 
group. Clinical and control group were matched on sex, age and verbal IQ as closely 
as possible (Table 2.1a and 2.1b, p.28).
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There were neither significant differences between the ASD group and control 
group with respect to age, verbal intelligence, performance intelligence, and full 
scale intelligence (p > .10 for all variables), nor between the ASD subgroups and the 
control group (p > .10) Within the ASD group, HFA and Asperger syndrome did not 
differ from each other on these variables either except for verbal intelligence, with 
HFA participants showing a significantly lower verbal intelligence than those with 
Asperger syndrome (p = .013). Still, the verbal intelligence of HFA participants was 
well above average. IQ was assessed with one of the various Wechsler Intelligence 
scales (WAIS-R, WAIS-III, WISC-R) in participants with ASD, and with a short form of 
the WAIS consisting of four subtests (Comprehension, Similarities, Block Design, and 
Picture Completion) in controls.
ASD
(n=28)
Control
(n=28)
mean (SD) range mean (SD) range
Age 26.8 (5.2) 19 - 40 26.3 (5.2) 19 - 39
VIQ 117.5 (13.6) 93 - 144 116.3 (12.9) 94 - 135
PIQ 115.1 (14.5) 84 - 144 121.4 (14.1) 94 - 144
FIQ 117.9 (13.7) 91 - 140 120.0 (12.2) 96 - 139
Table 2.1a. Description o f the matching variables fo r the ASD gr
Autistic disorder Asperger syndrome
(HFA, n = l l ) (n= l7 )
mean (SD) range mean (SD) range
Age 25.6 (3.8) 20 - 32 27.6 (5.9) 19 - 40
VIQ 109.8 (11.3) 93 - 128 122.4 (12.8) 100 - 144
PIQ 113.7 (15.3) 91 - 144 116 (14.4) 84 - 144
FIQ 112.5 (13.0) 91 - 134 121.5 (13.3) 91 - 140
Table 2.1b. Description o f the matching variables fo r the subgroups w ith in ASD.
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The diagnoses of autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome were established through 
expert clinical evaluation based on the DSM-IV criteria for these disorders (DSM-IV, 
1994). The clinical diagnosis was confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic Interview -  
Revised (ADI-R), which is a semi-structured developmental diagnostic interview with 
parents or caregivers (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994) and is based on behavior 
of the participant at the age of four-five years old. Seven included participants did 
not meet one of the four specified cutoffs of the ADI-R. This was mainly due to the 
fact that most of our participants received a diagnosis of ASD in adulthood and their 
parents did not recall the relevant data. In the case of two participants it was not 
possible to do an ADI-R because their parents had passed away. In all these cases, 
the clinical diagnosis of ASD was beyond doubt, meaning that they satisfied the full 
DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome, established by thorough 
clinical assessment, and presented with the typical clinical presentation of autistic 
disorder or Asperger syndrome. People with a PDD-NOS diagnosis were excluded 
as well as those with severe comorbid axis-I conditions like major depressive disor­
der, anxiety disorders, or ADHD.
The clinical group was recruited from the referrals to the psychiatric outpatient 
department of the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, specialized insti­
tutes for diagnosis and treatment of autism spectrum disorders, and via the website of 
the Dutch Autism Association. Data obtained from the clinical group were compared 
to a control group of 28 typically developing, healthy people. The control group was 
screened for any history of psychiatric disorders (Mini International Neuropsychi­
atric Interview plus, Sheehan et al., 1998) and was assessed particularly on features 
of autism, ADHD and depression by means of three self-report questionnaires: (i) 
Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), (ii) 
Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology Self-report (Rush, Gullion, Basco, Jarrett,
& Trivedi, 1996) and (iii) ADHD rating scale (Kooij et al., 2005). To ensure that no 
controls with autistic traits were included, a cutoff score on the Autism Quotient was 
set at 26 (which is 1.5 SD above the mean of a non-ASD control group, see Baron­
Cohen et al., 2001). The mean score of the control group on the Autism Quotient 
was 12 (SD = 4, range 3-18), whereas the mean score of the ASD group was 34 (SD 
= 9, range 19-47). The mean score on the Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology 
Self-report indicated that the ASD group was somewhat more depressed than the 
control group, but within the ASD group there were no significant differences. None 
of the participants with ASD had clinically significant depressive symptoms. The mean 
scores of the ADHD rating scale indicated no ADHD features in either group. All 
participants were native speakers of Dutch and had no known history of neurological 
disorder, head injury or reading problems. All participants had normal or corrected- 
to-normal vision.
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All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study and were reim­
bursed for travel expenses and participation. The study was formally approved by the 
local medical ethics committee. This experiment was part of a larger study, which also 
examined conditional reasoning in autism.
Materials
The Dutch materials for the implicature task comprised two kinds of scalar terms: 
some (“ sommige” ) and or (“ of” ). We deliberately chose to include two types of scalar 
terms, because previous studies suggest that there are differences in number of logi­
cal responses obtained, depending on what kind of scalar term is used.
There were four conditions for the scalar term some: true universals, underinfor- 
matives, false universals and true existentials (Table 2.2).
Condition Example Truth condition
True universals All sparrows are birds true
Underinformative some Some sparrows are birds true=logical, false=pragmatic
False universals All birds are sparrows false
True existentials Some birds are sparrows true
Table 2.2 Conditions fo r the scalar term  some.
Statements were constructed using the following ten categories: animals, flowers, 
trees, tools, insects, birds, musical instruments, fruits, garments and vehicles. Each 
category contained eight exemplars of that category, and hence there were 80 exem­
plars in total. The choice of exemplars was based on a study by Vonk (1978), who 
investigated prototypical examples of several categories. The most frequent exem­
plars were chosen for the current study.
Each condition consisted of 20 statements. The statements were presented in 
two versions to ensure that no participant saw the same exemplar more than once. 
Half of the participants saw exemplars 1-40 with the quantifier some (20 underin- 
formatives, 20 true existentials) and exemplars 41-80 with the quantifier all (20 true 
universals, 20 false universals). The other half of the participants saw the exemplars 
in the reverse order, i.e. exemplars 1-40 with the quantifier all and exemplars 41-80 
with the quantifier some. The two versions were counterbalanced across groups. 
Furthermore, 40 false fillers like “ Some fishes are buildings” (20 fillers with some and 
20 with all) were included. Fillers were not included in the data analysis. The exem­
plars were matched on lemma frequency and word length. There were no significant 
differences in frequency and word length between the conditions (F(3, 76) < 1, p = 
.78; F(3,76) = 1.99, p = .12).
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The some/all sentences were interspersed with sentences with the scalar term 
or. There were three conditions for this scalar expression: underinformatives, true 
disjunctions, and false disjunctions (Table 2.3). Each condition consisted of 20 state­
ments. The materials were matched on sentence length and mean word length 
(F(2,57) < 1, p = .89; F(2,57) < 1, p = .75).
In total, each participant saw 180 statements: 80 statements for the some/all task, 
60 statements for the disjunction task, and 40 fillers.Within the entire set, statements 
were varied pseudo-randomly in five different orders, so that the same condition 
never occurred twice in a row. Finally, the experimental statements were preceded 
by eight practice statements to familiarize the participants with the experimental 
setup.
Condition Example Truth condition
Underinformatives Zebras have black o r white stripes true=logical, false=pragmatic
True disjunctions T-shirts have short o r  long sleeves true
False disjunctions Snakes have paws o r wings false
Table 2.3 Conditions fo r the scalar term  or.
Procedures
The experiment was run on a laptop using the Presentation software package. Parti­
cipants were instructed to judge whether the statements were true or false. They 
were instructed to be accurate, but not to think too long about the correct response. 
Moreover, they were told that the computer recorded their responses and the time 
they had taken to respond. Each trial consisted of the presentation of a 1-second fixa­
tion cross followed by the presentation of the statement. Sentences were presented 
in the centre of the screen in a white font against a black background. To give their 
response participants had to press the left or right shift button, which were marked 
with overlays. To avoid a reaction time bias due to hand preference, the assignment 
of the right and left button for ‘true' responses was counterbalanced across partici­
pants. There was an optional rest break half way through the task.
Measurements
For each participant, response type and reading times were recorded. Reading times 
were recorded from the time when the statement appeared until the participant 
made a response. Furthermore, all participants underwent an assessment of their 
language abilities (semantics, syntax and phonology) using the subtest Comprehen­
sion of the Aachen Aphasia Test (Graetz, De Bleser, & Wilmes, 1992), the Offline 
Observation Instrument for Grammatical Comprehension (Wassenaar & Hagoort, 
1994) and the Auditory Discrimination Task - subtest C (Crul & Peters, 1976).
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Data analyses
We analyzed both the pattern of responses and reading times. Since each condition 
consisted of twenty items, percentages of correct responses were calculated per 
condition for each participant. As the distribution of these percentages of responses 
strongly deviated from a normal distribution, nonparametric Mann-Whitney tests 
(exact) were carried out to investigate response patterns. In addition, relevant corre­
lations between response outcomes and linguistic abilities were calculated
For the reading time data, individual cutoff values were calculated for each parti­
cipant as the mean ± 2 standard deviations over all items. Any value exceeding the 
cutoff was removed from the data set as were all error trials1. Over all, 8% of the data 
were removed (disjunction task: ASD group 8.5%, control group 7.7%; some/all task: 
ASD group 7.4%, control group 8.7%). Because the distribution of reading times for 
the some/all task was skewed to the right in both groups, and thus deviated from a 
normal distribution, a log transformation was carried out to reduce the skew.
Based on previous findings that pragmatic responders are slower than logical 
responders (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003) participants were divided 
into pragmatic responders and logical responders, depending on their response 
patterns: Participants who gave more than 50% ‘false' responses to the underinfor- 
mative statements belong to the category of Pragmatic Responders, whereas the 
others belong to the category of Logical Responders. Responder Type was entered 
as a between-subject factor.
Results
Analysis of response proportions
The ASD group and control group showed equal rates of logical interpretations for 
the underinformative conditions “ Some sparrows are birds” and “ Zebras have black 
or white stripes” (U = 317, p = .22; U = 391, p = .99). For the some underinformatives, 
24% of the responses were logical in the ASD group, whereas in the control group 
29% of the responses were logical (Table 2.4, p.33). Thus all participants derived 
the scalar implicature (i.e. pragmatic interpretation) quite often. Underinformative 
disjunctions elicited more logical interpretations than some: 47% of the responses 
were logical in the ASD group, whereas in the control group 46% of the responses 
were (Table 2.4). The groups did not differ significantly on the percentages of correct 
and error responses across the control conditions (all p’s > .10).
Since Asperger syndrome and HFA differ in language development profile, we 
performed a separate analysis with percentages of logical responses serving as 
dependent measure and diagnosis as a grouping variable. This analysis revealed that
1. Errors are those responses tha t deviate from the tru th  conditions as given in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
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Condition Examples ASD Controls
true false true false
True universals All sparrows are birds 95 5 93 7
Underinformatives Some sparrows are birds 24 76 29 71
False universals A ll birds are sparrows 2 98 3 97
True existentials Some birds are sparrows 96 4 95 5
Underinformatives Zebras have black o r white stripes 47 53 46 54
True disjunctions T-shirts have short o r  long sleeves 92 8 94 6
False disjunctions Snakes have paws o r wings 2 98 3 97
Table 2.4 Proportion o f responses (%) fo r the scalar terms some and or.
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Figure 2.1 Mean percentage o f logical interpretations fo r underinformative conditions. 
E rror bars represent 1 S.E.
0
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participants with HFA gave more logical responses to underinformative some than 
those with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome (U = 45.5, p = .022) (Figure 2.1, p. 33). 
This pattern was also present in underinformative disjunctions, though only at a 
marginally significant level (U = 52.5, p = .052). However, there were no significant 
differences between HFA participants and controls on the number of logical interpre­
tations (p > .10). A  direct comparison between Asperger's participants and controls 
revealed that the Asperger's participants drew significantly more scalar implicatures 
in the some/all-task than controls (U = 140, p = .020), but not in the disjunction task
(p > .10).
Linguistic abilities
To assess whether verbal intelligence plays a role in deriving implicatures,we employed 
a Pearson's correlation. We found a significant negative correlation between verbal 
intelligence and number of logical interpretations in the HFA group for the some/ 
all task (r = -.74, p = .009) and a weak trend for the disjunction task (r = -.54, p = 
.086), indicating that lower verbal IQ scores correlate with a higher number of logi­
cal interpretations. In the Asperger group as well as the control group no significant 
correlations were found between verbal IQ scores and number of logical interpreta­
tions (all p’s > .10).
To examine language comprehension we used the subtest Comprehension 
of the Aachen Aphasia Test (Graetz et al., 1992). The maximum score on this subtest 
is 120. A  score in the range 90-106 indicates mild language comprehension problems. 
We found that the HFA group scored significantly lower than the Asperger group 
and control group on this subtest of the Aachen Aphasia Test (U = 35.0, p = .005; U 
= 56.0. p = .001, Table 2.5), however, their mean score was still above the cutoff for 
mild impairments. The Asperger group and control group did not differ significantly 
on this subtest (p > .10).
Diagnosis AAT' Gram.2 ADIT-C3
HFA mean (SD) 108.2 (7.1) 139.4 (4.1) 46.9 (2.8)
range 95 - 116 131 - 143 42 - 50
Asperger mean (SD) 114.7 (3.6) 141.8 (3.1) 45.9 (4.2)
range 107 - 120 136 - 144 32 - 49
C ontro l mean (SD) 115.0 (4.5) 141.8 (3.2) 46.7 (3.7)
range 100 - 120 134 - 144 30 - 50
Table 2.5 Mean, standard deviation and range o f scores on the 'Aachen Aphasia Test
-  subtest Comprehension, 2Offline Observation Instrument fo r Grammatical 
Comprehension and 3A ud ito ry  Discrimination Task -  subtest C
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The Offline Observation Instrument for Grammatical Comprehension was used 
to assess grammatical skills. The maximum score on this test is 144. The HFA group 
scored significantly lower on this test than the Asperger group and the control group 
(U = 46.5, p = .022; U = 70.0, p = .005, Table 2.5). It turned out that the HFA group 
only had difficulties with understanding complex sentences containing a relative 
clause (e.g. “ The woman who pushes the man holds an umbrella” ), but not with 
understanding simple sentences or passives. The groups did not differ significantly on 
the Auditory Discrimination Task - subtest C, which has a maximum score of 50.
Although in the HFA group the number of logical responses correlated with 
verbal intelligence, there were no correlations between number of logical responses 
and scores on abovementioned language tests (p’s > .10).
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Analysis of reading times
As mentioned before, participants were divided into two groups, depending on their 
response patterns, because previous findings demonstrated that pragmatic respond­
ers are slower than logical responders (Bott & Noveck, 2004; Noveck & Posada, 2003). 
In the some/all task, 64% of the HFA participants, all of the Asperger participants, 
and 82% of the control participants were classified as pragmatic responders. In the 
disjunction task, 27% of the HFA participants, 76% of the Asperger participants and 
64% of the control participants were classified as pragmatic responders. Mean read­
ing times for each condition per participant were entered into repeated-measures 
ANOVAs with Condition as a within-subject factor and Diagnosis and Responder 
Type as between-subject factors.
This analysis showed a main effect of Condition (F(3,49) = 6.64, p =.001) and of 
Diagnosis (F(2,51) = 4.95, p = .011) for the some/all task (Figure 2.2, p.35). Post hoc 
tests showed that the HFA group was significantly slower than the Asperger group (p 
= .006) and control group (p = .010). There were no significant differences in read-
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Figure 2.4 Mean reading times for logical and pragmatic responders in the disjunction task.
ing times between the Asperger group and controls (p = .623). The disjunction task 
also showed a main effect of Condition (F(2, 100) = 26.16, p < .001) and of Diagnosis 
(F(2,50) = 4.01, p = .024) with slower responses for the HFA group than the control 
group (p = .022) (Figure 2.3, p.36). Moreover, there was an effect of Responder type 
(F(l,50) = 10.3, p = .002) with slower responses for pragmatic responders than logi­
cal responders, and a Condition x Responder type interaction (F(2,l00) = 6.31, p = 
.003) indicating that pragmatic responders needed more time for underinformative 
disjunctions and true disjunctions but not for false disjunctions, when compared to 
the logical responders (Figure 2.4). Planned paired t-tests between underinforma­
tive conditions and control conditions revealed that the underinformative conditions 
took more time to process than control conditions (p < .001 for all comparisons). 
However, within the groups, underinformative some and true existentials did not 
differ significantly in the control group (p = .091), and underinformative disjunctions 
and true disjunctions did not differ in the Asperger group (p = .096).
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Discussion
Contrary to our expectations, our results demonstrate that on the whole, high- 
functioning adults with ASD  are rather good at deriving implicatures. In particular, 
the performance of the Asperger syndrome group was better than expected: They 
were as fast as the control group and they were even better at deriving implicatures 
in the case of the scalar term some. Strikingly, the HFA group derived fewer implica­
tures than the Asperger group. Participants with HFA more often gave a logical inter­
pretation to underinformative sentences like “ Some sparrows are birds” than did 
participants with Asperger syndrome. Moreover, the HFA participants were slower in 
responding, which suggests that the task was more difficult for them. Furthermore, in 
the HFA group the rate of logical interpretations was associated with verbal intelli­
gence: lower verbal intelligence correlated with fewer scalar implicatures. In contrast, 
we did not find such a correlation either in the control group or in the Asperger 
group.
A  potential but almost inevitable limitation of the present study concerns the 
significant difference in verbal intelligence between the HFA group and Asperger 
group. This raises the possibility that the findings are primarily due to a difference 
in language ability. Indeed, the findings suggest that language ability may be relevant 
for computing scalar implicatures in HFA. The fact that the rate of scalar implica­
tures was linked with level of verbal intelligence in the HFA group indicates that 
verbal intelligence is a constraint on task performance in HFA, and that people with 
HFA may employ verbal intelligence to compensate for pragmatic deficits. It should 
be stressed, however, that it is far from clear how exactly verbal intelligence might 
contribute to the interpretation of scalar expressions. Since verbal intelligence is 
a general measure with several components (e.g. verbal working memory, concept 
formation, and factual knowledge), it is hard to tell at this point which of these could 
be involved in the derivation of implicatures, and what kind of role they might play.
Moreover, it is unclear what role formal language abilities play in deriving impli­
catures. Assessment of these abilities revealed that the HFA group scored lower on 
a language comprehension test and a grammaticality test compared to the Asperger 
group and controls. However, performance of the HFA group on language compre­
hension was well above the threshold for mild language comprehension problems, and 
hence the finding that HFA participants derived fewer implicatures cannot be attrib­
uted to any particular language comprehension deficiencies. Furthermore, though the 
HFA group scored lower on the grammaticality test, performance was still close to 
the maximum level. Errors in grammatical comprehension were restricted to complex 
sentences containing relative clauses (e.g. “ The woman who pushes the man holds 
an umbrella” ), and did not affect simple sentences as used in the current experiment. 
Finally, the HFA group only showed a correlation between the number of scalar
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implicatures and level of verbal intelligence, but no such correlations were found for 
formal language abilities. Perhaps using more sophisticated linguistic measures could 
reveal what role language abilities play in understanding scalar expressions.
An important issue is how scalar implicatures can be related to two dominant 
cognitive theories on autism. In the light of the weak central coherence account, 
it could be argued that a logical interpretation of a scalar expression is due to a 
processing bias for the local meaning (i.e. the literal or logical meaning) and a disre­
gard of the global meaning (i.e. the pragmatic meaning). However, as mentioned in the 
introduction, to arrive at the global meaning, some form of theory of mind reasoning 
is involved. For example, to derive that “ Not all students passed their exam” from 
“ Some students passed their exam” , the listener must assume that the speaker does 
not have the belief that all students passed their exam, for otherwise he would have 
said so. W ith  regard to the dominant cognitive theories on autism, we therefore think 
that it is more plausible to assume that deriving scalar implicatures is related to the 
theory of mind account. Moreover, as discussed above, language abilities presumably 
play a role in scalar implicature, too.
The finding that participants with ASD  were as likely as controls to derive scalar 
implicatures calls for an explanation. First, it should be noted that our participants 
were of average or above average intelligence and it might be that they employed 
their cognitive capacities for solving the task. Second, and more importantly, we 
should look at what kind of theory of mind reasoning is involved in scalar implica­
tures, because the attribution of first-order mental states (e.g. Peter does not know 
that ...) must be distinguished from the attribution of second-order or higher order 
mental states (e.g. Peter does not know that John knows that ....). According to 
Happé (1993), first-order representations involve recognizing a speaker's informative 
intention, whereas second-order representations involve recognizing communicative 
intentions. In this perspective, scalar implicatures concern the attribution of first­
order mental states, as they involve recognizing the speaker's informative intention. 
This may explain why participants with ASD did so well on the scalar implicature 
tasks, since several studies investigating theory of mind task in persons with ASD  of 
average or above average intelligence have shown that a considerable number of such 
individuals - and those with Asperger syndrome in particular - can pass first-order 
and even second-order theory of mind tasks (Bauminger & Kasari, 1999; Bowler, 
1992; Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-Barneveld, & van der Gaag, 1999; Dahlgren & 
Trillingsgaard, 1996; Happé, 1994; Ozonoff, Rogers, & Pennington, 1991; Tager-Flusberg 
& Sullivan, 1994). Finally, it is possible the experimental setting may have facilitated 
task performance, since communicative demands are reduced in a computerized task 
(Ozonoff, 1995b). Future research should focus on the role of theory of mind abilities 
as well as language abilities in interpreting scalar expressions.
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The last point we would like to mention concerns the controversy whether 
Asperger syndrome is a variant of (high-functioning) autism or a distinct disorder 
(Frith, 2004; Macintosh & Dissanayake, 2004). Although a considerable amount of 
literature has addressed this issue, recent studies are still contradictory. Accord­
ing to Ritvo et al. (2007) Asperger syndrome is a mild form of autism with fewer 
but similar symptoms. Against this position, Matsons and Wilkins (2007) argue that 
Asperger syndrome can be differentiated from high-functioning autism on a range 
of symptoms. Although the present findings cannot offer any decisive evidence in 
favor of one position or the other, they suggest that a differentiation can be made 
between Asperger syndrome and high-functioning autism in terms of deriving scalar 
implicatures and of pragmatic reasoning. It appears that the very early distinction 
between Asperger syndrome and autistic disorder - based on the onset of first words 
and phrases - continues to exist in adulthood, at least at the level of more subtle 
and complex linguistic functioning. Therefore, it may be useful for clinical as well 
as research purposes to distinguish subgroups based on the early language profile 
within the autism spectrum, and to study the link between these language profiles 
and pragmatic reasoning over development. W e  further plan to investigate the neural 
correlates of pragmatic reasoning in ASD using event-related brain potentials. This 
would allow us to investigate the processes involved in pragmatic tasks with high 
temporal resolution.
chapter 3
Defeasible reasoning in high-functioning adults 
with autism: evidence for impaired exception- 
handling
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A b strac t
W hile autism is one of the most intensively researched psychiatric disorders, little 
is known about reasoning skills of people with autism. The focus of this study was 
on defeasible inferences, that is, inferences that can be revised in the light of new 
information. W e  used a behavioral task to investigate (a) conditional reasoning and 
(b) the suppression of conditional inferences in high-functioning adults with autism. 
In the suppression task a possible exception was made salient which could prevent a 
conclusion from being drawn. W e  predicted that the autism group would have diffi­
culties dealing with such exceptions because they require mental flexibility to adjust 
to the context, which is often impaired in autism. The findings confirm our hypothesis 
that high-functioning adults with autism have a specific difficulty with exception- 
handling during reasoning. It is suggested that defeasible reasoning is also involved 
in other cognitive domains. Implications for neural underpinnings of reasoning and 
autism are discussed.
This chapter has been based on: Pijnacker, J. , Geurts, B., van Lambalgen, M. , Kan, 
C.C., Buitelaar, J.K., Hagoort, P. (2009), Defeasible reasoning in autism: evidence of 
impaired exception-handling, Neuropsychologia 47 (3), 644-651
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In troduction
Autism is a developmental disorder characterized by deficits in social interaction and 
communication, and by restrictive, stereotyped and repetitive behaviors and narrow 
interests (DSM-IV, 1994). A  hallmark of autism is reduced mental flexibility (Geurts, 
Verte, Oosterlaan, Roeyers, & Sergeant, 2004; Hill, 2004b; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; 
Ozonoff, Strayer, McMahon, & Filloux, 1994). This term refers to the ability to shift a 
thought or action when the situation or context changes. Mental flexibility is a broad 
concept lacking a precise definition. W e  will investigate the notion of mental flex­
ibility in autism by focusing on a specific, well-defined domain, namely reasoning. As 
will be shown in the discussion, a particular form of reasoning is a common factor in 
several tasks that have been shown to be difficult for people with autism.
Although autism is one of the most intensively researched psychiatric disorders, 
little is known about the reasoning skills of people with autism. Most research has 
focused on theory-of-mind reasoning, which involves attributing beliefs and inten­
tions to other people to predict and understand behavior (e.g. Baron-Cohen, 1995; 
Baron-Cohen, Tager-Flusberg, & Cohen, 1993). Only few studies have investigated 
logical reasoning, and thus far, findings are not very consistent (Leevers & Harris, 
2000; Scott & Baron-Cohen, 1996; Scott, Baron-Cohen, & Leslie, 1997). More impor­
tantly, these studies have overlooked an essential aspect of reasoning, namely that 
everyday reasoning requires more than strict rule-following, because almost all rules 
allow exceptions. Most rules are defeasible and can be revised in the light of new 
information. For instance, we expect a lamp to light if we switch it on, but we will 
withdraw this inference if the lamp turns out to be broken. Because one has to 
adjust one's conclusions when the context changes, mental flexibility is necessary for 
defeasible reasoning. Because it is mental flexibility that is often reduced in autism, we 
expect people with autism to experience difficulties with defeasible reasoning. In fact, 
as we will discuss below, we expect them to have problems with a specific form of 
defeasible reasoning. A  good tool for investigating defeasible reasoning is the suppres­
sion task. Based on a logical analysis of this task by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005; 
2007; 2008) we are able to formulate precise hypotheses. The suppression task will 
be discussed in detail below.
Suppression task
The suppression task is a conditional reasoning task, in which a conditional sentence 
of the form “ If p then q” is always the first premise. There are four forms of condi­
tional inference:
4. Modus ponens
If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
44 c h a p te r  3
Mary has an exam.
Mary will study in the library.
5. Modus tollens
If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
Mary will not study in the library.
Mary does not have an exam.
6. Affirmation of the consequent
If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
Mary will study in the library.
Mary has an exam.
7. Denial of the antecedent
If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
Mary does not have an exam.
Mary will not study in the library.
In classical logic, only modus ponens and modus tollens are considered valid. On the 
other hand, neither affirmation of the consequent nor denial of the antecedent lead 
to valid conclusions according to classical logic.
It is now widely accepted that people often do not reason according to the 
rules of classical logic, and rightly so, because classical logic is not entirely adequate 
when it comes to reasoning with conditionals. First, a considerable number of people 
endorse affirmation of the consequent and denial of the antecedent, though these 
inferences are invalid according to classical logic. For example, a conditional like “ If 
Peter washes my car, I will give him five euros” is often understood as “ If and only if 
Peter washes my car, I will give him five euros” . That means, if I give Peter five euros, 
people tend to infer that Peter washed my car (= affirmation of the consequent). 
And if Peter did not wash my car, people are likely to conclude that I will not give 
him five euros (= denial of the antecedent). Both affirmation of the consequent and 
denial of antecedent are explained as resulting from pragmatic processes and are 
called invited inferences (Geis & Zwicky, 1971; Horn, 2000). Secondly, modus ponens 
and modus tollens - which should always be valid according to classical logic - can be 
suppressed in the light of extra information (Bonnefon & Hilton, 2002; Byrne, 1989; 
Byrne, Espino, & Santamaria, 1999; Chan & Chua, 1994; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & 
Rist, 1991; Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyens, & d'Ydewalle, 2000; Politzer & Bourmaud, 
2002). For example:
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8. Modus ponens with additional premise
a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
b. If the library is open, Mary will study in the library.
c. Mary has an exam.
d. W ill Mary study in the library?
This reasoning problem was presented with and without premise 8b. As soon as the 
extra premise (8b) came in, the number of people concluding that Mary will study in 
the library, dropped to about 50%, whereas without the extra premise most people 
endorsed the conclusion (Byrne et al., 1999). The addition of the extra premise (8b) 
leads to a significant decrease of the rate at which a valid inference is endorsed. This 
example clearly illustrates that conditional reasoning is nonmonotonic and defeasible, 
which means that new information can affect an inference. Classical logic, however, 
is monotonic: Extra information can never change a conclusion. This makes classical 
logic context-insensitive. In contrast, nonmonotonic, defeasible reasoning is context- 
dependent. It is the context that determines whether inferences are endorsed or 
not. This form of reasoning makes demands on mental flexibility, because one has 
to adjust one's conclusion when the context changes. For this reason, we expect 
that defeasible reasoning might be difficult for people with autism, as they have been 
shown to be less flexible and less sensitive to context (Happé, 1997; Hill, 2004b; 
Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 2000; Ozonoff & Jensen, 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1994).
Based on a logical analysis of the suppression task by Stenning and Van Lambal- 
gen (2005; 2007; 2008), we can formulate more specific hypotheses with regard to 
defeasible reasoning in autism. According to Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005; 2007; 
2008) modus ponens and modus tollens both involve a specific form of defeasible 
reasoning, namely closed-world reasoning with regard to exceptions. That means, 
exceptions are considered to be not the case, as long as evidence to the contrary is 
not available. In the suppression task, the conditional (8a) can be interpreted as “ If 
Mary has an exam and nothing abnormal is the case, she will study in the library.” If 
we know that Mary has an exam (8c) and further assume that there no exceptions 
(by applying closed-world reasoning to exceptions), we can conclude that Mary will 
study in the library. However, if an additional premise (8b) is added, the closed-world 
assumption cannot be maintained anymore, because now a possible exception has 
become salient, namely that the library may be closed. For modus tollens a similar 
analysis holds: Since we do not know whether Mary does not study in the library 
because she has no exam or because the library is closed, no definite conclusion can 
be drawn.
The important thing is that closed-world reasoning to exceptions requires disre­
garding all possible exceptions as long as there is no evidence thereof, but at the
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same time keeping open the possibility that one has overlooked a relevant exception 
and adjust when necessary. This implies flexible thinking: one should discern when an 
abnormality in a particular context is relevant and when to disregard it. W e  hypoth­
esize that it is such dealing with exceptions (so called exception-handling) that is 
the difficult part of defeasible reasoning for people with autism, because they have 
reduced mental flexibility to adjust to the context.
To show that the problems people with autism experience are due to exception- 
handling and not due to problems with integrating linguistic information or defeasibil­
ity in general, we will also consider arguments with alternative premises (9,10).
9. Affirmation of the consequent with alternative premise
a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
b. If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library.
c. Mary will study in the library.
d. Does she have an exam?
10. Modus ponens with alternative premise
a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
b. If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library.
c. Mary has an exam.
d. W ill Mary study in the library?
Alternative premises like (9b) can suppress the invited inferences affirmation 
of the consequent (9) and denial of the antecedent, but do not suppress the valid 
inferences modus ponens (10) and modus tollens. The invited inferences affirmation 
of the consequent and denial of the antecedent do not involve closed-world reason­
ing to exceptions, but involve a different kind of closed-world reasoning. For denial 
of the antecedent, one assumes that in the absence of further information, having 
an exam is the only reason for studying in the library. Therefore, given that Mary 
does not have an exam, one can conclude that Mary will not study in the library. 
For affirmation of the consequent, one supposes that only those rules hold that are 
explicitly given, that is, (9a) is the only rule. Other rules that have “ Mary will study 
in the library” as consequent are assumed to be not the case. Alternative premises 
like (9b) can suppress invited inferences, because an alternative reason for studying 
in the library is introduced. The effect of alternative premises (9b) on invited infer­
ences was already shown by Rumain, Connell and Braine (1983), who found that both 
adults and children made fewer invited inferences when alternative antecedents were 
provided.
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If people with autism have problems with defeasible inferences across the board, 
and therefore stick to a purely classical logic, then they will show no change in 
rates at which conclusions are endorsed when additional or alternative premises 
are provided. This will be reflected in neither suppressing valid inferences with addi­
tional premises (modus ponens, modus tollens) nor suppressing invited inferences 
with alternative premises (affirmation of the consequent, denial of the antecedent). 
However, if people with autism have specific problems with exception-handling, they 
will show less suppression of modus ponens and modus tollens with additional prem­
ises than matched controls, but equal suppression of invited inferences with alterna­
tive premises.
M ethods
Participants
Participants in this study included 28 high-functioning adults with autism (autistic 
disorder (HFA), n=ll and Asperger syndrome, n=l7) and 28 matched controls, aged 
18 to 40 years. Both groups consisted of 20 male and 8 female subjects. The groups 
were matched for handedness, with 24 right-handed en 4 left-handed individuals in 
each group. Clinical and control participants were individually matched on sex, age 
and verbal IQ as closely as possible (Table 3.1).
ti s
85 
3 Control
(n=28)
mean (SD) range mean (SD) range
Age 26.8 (5.2) 19 - 40 26.3 (5.2) 19 - 39
V IQ 117.5 (13.6) 93 - 144 116.3 (12.9) 94 - 135
PIQ 115.1 (14.5) 84 - 144 121.4 (14.1) 94 - 144
FIQ 117.9 (13.7) 91 - 140 120.0 (12.2) 96 - 139
Table 3.1 Description of the matching variables.
There were no significant differences between the autism group and control group 
on age, verbal intelligence, performance intelligence, and full scale intelligence (p > 
.10 for all variables). IQ  was assessed with one of the Wechsler Intelligence scales 
(WAIS-R, WAIS-III, W ISC-R) in participants with autism, and with a short form of the 
W A IS  in controls.
The diagnoses of autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome were established 
through expert clinical evaluation based on the DSM-IV criteria for these disorders 
(DSM-IV, 1994). Clinical diagnosis was confirmed by the Autism Diagnostic Interview 
- Revised (ADI-R), which is a structured developmental diagnostic interview with
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parents or caregivers (Lord, 1994) and which is based on behavior of the participant 
at the age of four-five years old. Seven participants did not meet one of the four 
specified cut-offs of the ADI-R. This was mainly due to the fact that most of our 
participants received a diagnosis of autism in adulthood and their parents did not 
recall the relevant data. In the case of two participants it was not possible to do an 
ADI-R because their parents had passed away. In all these cases, the clinical diagnosis 
of autism was beyond doubt. People with a PDD-NOS diagnosis were excluded as 
well as those with severe comorbid axis-I conditions like major depressive disorder, 
anxiety disorders, or ADHD.
The clinical group was recruited from the referrals to the psychiatric outpa­
tient department of the Radboud University Nijmegen Medical Centre, specialized 
institutes for diagnosis and treatment of autism spectrum disorders, and via the 
website of the Dutch Autism Association. Data obtained from the clinical group were 
compared to a control group of 28 typically developing, healthy people. The control 
group was screened for any history of psychiatric disorders using the Mini Interna­
tional Neuropsychiatric Interview plus (Sheehan, 1998) and was assessed particu­
larly on the presence of symptoms of autism, A D H D  and depression by means of 
three self-report questionnaires: (i) Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001), (ii) Inventory of Depressive Symptomatology Self­
report (Rush, 1996), and (iii) A D H D  rating scale (Kooij et al., 2005). To ensure that no 
controls with autistic traits were included, a cutoff score on the Autism Quotient was 
set at 26 (maximum score is 50). The mean score of the control group on the Autism 
Quotient was 12 (SD = 4, range 3-18), whereas the mean score of the autism group 
was 34 (SD = 9, range 19-47). The mean score on the Inventory of Depressive Symp­
tomatology Self-report indicates no depression for the control group and possibly 
or slightly depressed in case of the autism group. The mean scores of the AD H D  
rating scale indicate no A D H D  features in both groups. All participants were native 
speakers of Dutch and had no known history of neurological disorder, head injury or 
reading problems. All participants had normal or corrected-to-normal vision.
All participants gave informed consent to participate in the study and were reim­
bursed for travel expenses and participation. The study was formally approved by the 
local medical ethics committee. This experiment was part of a larger study, which also 
examined scalar implicatures in autism.
Materials
The experiment consisted of two tasks. The first task was a simple conditional 
reasoning task, containing two premises and a question. For example:
11. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
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Mary has an exam.
W ill she study in the library?
Four different inference patterns were examined: modus ponens (MP), modus tollens 
(MT), denial of the antecedent (DA), and affirmation of the consequent (AC) (Table 
3.2). Ten different conditional premises were constructed, which were used in each 
inference pattern to keep word frequency and sentence length constant across condi­
tions. In total there were 40 reasoning problems. It should be noted that response 
patterns indicate how participants reason: endorsement of AC  (‘yes' response) 
and DA (‘no' response) are indicative of invited inferences, whereas inconclusive 
responses are indicative of reasoning according to classical logic.
Inference Example Conclusion
MP If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library
Mary has an exam
W ill she study in the library?
yes
MT If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library 
Mary will not study in the library 
Does she have an exam?
no
AC If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library 
Mary will study in the library 
Does she have an exam?
maybe = classical logic 
yes = invited inference
DA If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library 
Mary does not have an exam 
W ill she study in the library?
maybe = classical logic 
no = invited inference
Table 3.2 Examples of the four inference types used in the simple task and expected answer 
patterns.
The second task - the suppression task - comprised the same materials as the 
simple task except that an extra premise had been added. The extra premise was an 
additional or an alternative premise (Table 3.3, p.50). Thus each reasoning problem 
of the simple task occurred with an additional and with an alternative premise, so in 
total there were 80 reasoning problems in the suppression task. The types of inter­
pretations that participants assigned to the conditional can be inferred from their 
response patterns: taking into account exceptions will result in ‘maybe' responses for 
MP and MT with an additional premise (i.e. suppression of MP and MT), whereas
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Inference Example Sup No sup
MP add If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If the library is open, Mary will study in the library. 
Mary has an exam.
W ill she study in the library?
maybe yes
MP alt If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library 
Mary has an exam.
W ill she study in the library?
n.a. n.a.
MT add If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If the library is open, Mary will study in the library. 
Mary will not study in the library.
Does she have an exam?
maybe no
MT alt If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library 
Mary will not study in the library.
Does she have an exam?
n.a. n.a.
A C  add If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If the library is open, Mary will study in the library. 
Mary will study in the library.
Does she have an exam?
n.a. n.a.
A C  alt If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library. 
Mary will study in the library.
Does she have an exam?
maybe yes
DA add If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If the library is open, Mary will study in the library. 
Mary does not have an exam.
W ill she study in the library?
n.a. n.a.
DA alt If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
If Mary has an essay to write, she will study in the library. 
Mary does not have an exam.
W ill she study in the library?
maybe no
Table 3.3 Examples of additional (=add) and alternative (=alt) premises in the suppression 
task and expected answer patterns for suppression and no suppression. n.a. = not 
applicable
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taking into account alternatives will result in ‘maybe' responses for AC and DA with 
an alternative premise (i.e. suppression of invited inferences). Participants always 
performed the simple task first. Within tasks, items were varied pseudo-randomly 
in five different orders. The same conditional premises never occurred consecutively 
and there were at most two identical inference patterns in succession.
Procedures
The experiment was run on a laptop using the Presentation software package. 
Instructions and some practice trials preceded the tasks. Participants were instructed 
that they would be presented with two statements (and three for the suppression 
task), which they had to read carefully and to assume that they were true. They were 
instructed that after the statements a question about the statements would follow 
that had to be answered by pressing the buttons ‘yes', ‘no' or ‘maybe'.
They had to read the premises first and subsequently - after a button press - the 
question appeared below the premises. They were told that the computer recorded 
their responses and the time they needed to respond. To ensure that participants 
read the sentences properly before pressing the button for the question, dummies 
were included in which the premises disappeared when the question appeared on the 
screen. These dummies had 1% error responses, which indicate that the sentences 
were read properly. After pressing the button for the answer, the next reasoning 
problem appeared on the screen. Participants had to press the left or right button to 
give their yes/no response, and the space bar for ‘maybe'. The buttons were marked 
with overlays. To avoid a reaction time bias due to hand preference, the assignment of 
the right and left button for ‘yes' responses was counterbalanced across participants. 
For each participant, response type and reading times were recorded. Reading times 
were determined by measuring the time from appearance of the question until the 
moment that the participants gave their response. There were optional rest breaks 
between the tasks and half way through the tasks.
Data analyses
W e analyzed both the pattern of responses and reading times. Since each condi­
tion consisted of ten items, percentages of ‘yes', ‘no' and ‘maybe' responses were 
calculated per condition for each participant. As the distribution of these percent­
ages of responses strongly deviated from a normal distribution, nonparametric 
Mann-Whitney tests (exact, two-tailed) were carried out to investigate response 
patterns. However, simply comparing the endorsement rates of the inferences in the 
suppression task is not sufficient, because it would not take into account the base­
line endorsement of the reasoning problems in the simple task. Therefore, we also
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calculated the conditional probability of suppression in the suppression task given 
endorsement in the simple task for each participant. To illustrate how conditional 
probabilities were calculated, we will give an example: If someone endorsed 8 MP 
items out of 10 in the simple task (i.e. 8 ‘yes' responses), the probability is 0.8. If that 
participant suppressed 2 MP items out of 10 in the suppression task (i.e. 2 ‘maybe' 
responses), but one of these 2 items was not endorsed in the simple task, the prob­
ability is 0.1. The conditional probability of suppressed items given endorsed items in 
the simple task is 0.125, which means that 12.5% of the endorsed items in the simple 
task were suppressed in the suppression task (in formula: P(B | A ) = P(A&B) / P(A) 
where A  = endorsed items in simple task and B = suppressed items in suppression 
task. P(A&B) = 0.1 and P(A) is 0.8).
For the reading time data, a log transformation was carried out, because the 
distribution of reading times was skewed to the right in both groups. Individual cut­
off values were calculated for each participant as the mean ± 2 standard deviations 
over all items. Any value exceeding the cut-off was removed from the data set as 
were all error trials. Responses were considered as error if they were deviant from 
classical logic and closed-world reasoning, for example, a ‘yes' response for modus 
tollens (see Table 3.4 for what was counted as error). Over all participants, 6.3% of 
the reading time data were removed in the simple task (autism group 5.7%, control 
group 6.8%), and 5.3% of the reading time data were removed in the suppression task 
(autism group 5.6%, control group 4.7%). Mean reading times for each condition per 
participant were entered into repeated-measures ANOVAs with Inference (MP, MT, 
AC, DA) as a within-subject factor and Group (Autism, Control) as between-subject 
factor.
Inference Error response
MP no
MT yes
AC no
DA yes
Table 3.4. Responses that were counted as errors.
Results
Analysis of responses
In the simple task, both groups endorsed MP and MT at equally high rates, and did not 
differ significantly in the number of ‘yes' responses for MP and ‘no' responses for MT 
(see Table 3.5 and 3.6, p.53). Endorsement of AC and DA (a ‘yes' response for AC and 
‘no' response for DA) was at a lower rate in both groups. There was a trend for the
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Autism Control
%  responses yes no maybe yes no maybe
MP 89.6 0.0 10.4 96.1 2.5 1.4
MP add 71.0 1.1 28.0 51.1 0.7 48.2
MP alt 92.9 0.4 6.8 97.5 0.7 1.8
MT 1.4 79.6 19.0 2.5 92.8 4.7
MT add 0.7 62.1 37.1 0.7 45.0 54.3
MT alt 0.4 90.3 9.3 1.1 95.0 3.9
AC 45.0 1.1 53.9 67.1 2.1 30.7
A C  add 28.1 1.1 70.9 35.7 0.0 64.3
A C  alt 12.2 2.2 85.7 9.6 0.0 90.4
DA 1.1 48.0 50.9 0.4 69.1 30.6
DA add 2.9 28.9 68.2 2.5 33.6 63.9
DA alt 3.2 15.7 81.1 1.1 10.4 88.5
Table 3.5 Proportion of responses for the simple task and the suppression task.
Autism - Control Simple task Suppression task
p-value U p-value U
MP ( ‘yes') .151 323 .010 237
MT (‘no') .092 296 .066 281
A C  (‘yes') .079 287 .704 370
DA (‘no') .054 278 .396 342
Table 3.6. Differences in endorsement rates between the autism group and control group 
for the simple task and the suppression task (additional premises for MP and MT, 
alternative premises for A C  and DA).
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autism group to endorse AC  and DA less often than the control group and to 
respond ‘maybe' more frequently (Table 3.5 and 3.6, p.53). Participants with autism 
also responded ‘maybe' more often in case of MP and MT (U = 292, p = .029 for 
MP and U = 252, p = .010 for MT). This result can be attributed to four participants 
with autism who were responsible for the majority of ‘maybe' answers for MP and 
six participants (including the four above) who were responsible for the majority of 
‘maybe' responses for MT (see Discussion).
In case of the additional premise, the autism group showed significantly less 
suppression of MP (U = 234, p = .008) than the control group and less suppression of 
MT at marginal significance level (U = 277, p = .058), thus, more endorsement of MP 
and MT (Table 3.6 and figure 3.1). There were no significant differences between the 
groups for additional premises in AC and DA (p’s > .10). For the alternative premise, 
both groups showed equally high rates of ‘maybe' responses for AC  and DA and high 
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Figure 3.1 Suppression of modus ponens (MP) and modus tollens (MT) with additional 
premise, and suppression of affirmation of the consequent (AC) and denial 
of the antecedent with alternative premise (DA) (% maybe responses).
Error bars represent 1 S.E.
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proportions of endorsement of MP and MT (all p’s > .10). The percentages of errors 
(see Table 3.4, p.52) were low and the groups showed no significant differences in 
number of errors (p’s > .10), except for AC  with alternative premise (U = 336, p = 
.040). However, this effect is negligible, because the number of errors was very low 
(see Table 3.5, p.53).
Furthermore, participants with a diagnosis of autistic disorder (high-functioning 
autism / HFA) endorsed inferences in the simple task at the same rate as the partici­
pants with a diagnosis of Asperger syndrome (p’s > .10), except for a trend for MT 
with HFA participants showing more ‘maybe' responses (U = 56, p = .062). For the 
suppression task, there were no significant differences between the HFA group and 
the Asperger group in suppression of MP and MT and suppression of AC and DA (all 
p’s > .10).
Because simply comparing the endorsement rates of the inferences in the suppres­
sion task would not take into account the baseline endorsement of the problems in 
the simple task, we also calculated the conditional probabilities of suppression, which 
represent the probability of suppressed items given the probability of endorsed items 
in the simple task. W e  found significant differences between the autism group and 
control group for both MP and MT with additional premise (U = 242, p = .013; U 
= 258, p = .027). The autism group showed significantly less suppression of MP and 
MT with additional premise than the control group. For AC and DA with alternative 
premises, conditional probabilities of suppression of invited conclusions were calcu­
lated for those participants who showed invited inferences in the simple task. For 
both AC and DA no significant differences were found between groups in conditional 
probability of suppression of invited inferences given the probability of endorsed 
inferences in the simple task (p’s > .10).
Finally, we examined endorsement rates in the simple and suppression task per 
group to check for purely classical logical reasoning, which means that endorsement 
rates do not change when extra information is supplied in the suppression task. As 
displayed in Table 3.7 (p.56), both groups showed significantly less endorsement of 
MP and MT, and less endorsement of AC  and DA in the suppression task compared 
to the simple task.
Analysis of reading times
A  repeated measures A N O VA  on mean reading times of the simple task showed a 
main effect of Inference (F(3,i62) = 18.3, p < .001), no significant effect of Group (p
> .10) and no significant Inference x Group interaction (p = .096). Posthoc paired 
t-tests revealed that responses to MP were faster than to MT and DA, but not faster 
than to AC. Responses to MT and DA were equally fast, as well. Finally, responses to 
AC  were faster than to DA.
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A  repeated m easures A N O V A  on mean reading tim es o f the suppression task 
w ith  Inference (MP, MT, A C  and D A ) and A rgum ent (additional, a lternative) as with- 
in-subject factors and G ro u p  as between-subject facto r showed a main effect of 
Inference (F (3 ,I6 2 ) = 74.7, p < .001). M o reo ve r there  was a main effect o f A rg u ­
m ent (F (I,5 4 ) = 45.4, p < .001) and an Inference x  A rgum ent interaction (F(3, 162)= 
7.78, p < .001) indicating that inferences w ith  additional prem ises to o k  m ore tim e 
to  respond than w ith  alternative premises, except fo r DA . T here  w as no significant
effect of G ro u p  (p > . 10).
Simple task - Autism Control
suppression task p-value U p-value U
MP (‘yes') .007 238 < .001 54
MT ( ‘no') .041 270 < .001 83
A C  ( ‘yes') .004 225 < .001 98
DA ( ‘no') .001 193 < .001 113
Table 3.7 Differences in endorsement rates between the simple task and the suppression
task (additional premises for MP and MT, alternative premises for AC  and DA) for 
each group.
Discussion
This study investigated how  high-functioning adults w ith  autism deal w ith  extra infor­
mation during conditional reasoning. W e  hypothesized that they  w ou ld  have a specific 
problem  w ith  exception-handling due to  reduced mental flexibility to  adjust to  the 
context. The findings of the simple task showed that high-functioning adults w ith 
autism are good at conditional reasoning. The autism  group showed equally high 
proportions of modus ponens and modus to llens inferences and no significant differ­
ences in reading tim es. The suppression task revealed that although participants w ith  
autism w ere  good at conditional reasoning, they  had difficulties w ith  exceptions. They 
showed less suppression o f modus ponens (M P ) and modus to llens (M T ) when an 
exception w as made salient, but equal suppression of affirm ation o f the consequent 
(A C ) and denial of the antecedent (D A ) when alternative premises w e re  available. 
Because th ey  w e re  able to  suppress invited inferences (A C  and D A ) w hen an a lterna­
tive prem ise w as available, it is not defeasibility as such that is problem atic in autism. 
M oreover, that the autism  group showed equal suppression of invited inferences 
strongly suggests it is not the integration of linguistic inform ation that is problem atic 
either, as has been proposed by a num ber of studies supporting the W e a k  Centra l 
C oherence  account (Frith  &  Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe &  Baron-Cohen, 
2000)
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An alternative explanation is that suppression of invited inferences in the suppres­
sion task could be explained by that the autism group also showed more inconclu­
sive responses to affirmation of the consequent and denial of the antecedent in the 
simple task, and thus seemed to reason more according to classical logic than the 
control group. However, when comparing endorsement rates in the suppression task 
with those in the simple task, it turned out that the autism group endorsed fewer 
inferences in the suppression task, as did the control group. In other words, like the 
control group, participants with autism who endorsed affirmation of the consequent 
and denial of the antecedent in the simple task were able to suppress the invited 
inferences when an alternative premise became available. W e  can therefore conclude 
that the autism group was capable of integrating the alternative premises Moreover, 
when exceptions were supplied, modus ponens and modus tollens were endorsed 
at a lower rate in both groups, though the autism group took significantly fewer 
exceptions into account than the control group. To conclude, our findings cannot 
be attributed to a purely classical logical reasoning style in autism, because in that 
case no change of endorsement of conditional inferences would have occurred when 
extra premises were provided.
In the simple task there were four participants with autism who exhibited a 
deviant pattern for modus ponens and six (including the four above) who exhibited 
a deviant pattern for modus tollens, indicating some heterogeneity within the autism 
group. These participants gave substantially more inconclusive answers (‘maybe') 
to modus ponens and modus tollens than the other participants. Presumably these 
participants did not apply closed-world reasoning at all in order to anticipate any 
possible exception. Although our findings suggest that these participants took excep­
tions into account during reasoning, this does not mean that they are good at excep­
tion-handling. The pattern that they exhibited might be a strategy and just the other 
side of the coin: one can refuse to adjust to exceptions, or always anticipate excep­
tions and endorse no valid inference at all. In both cases, no flexibility is required 
because one can stick to one's initial conclusion without adjusting if new information 
becomes available. Finally, we should note that the majority of these participants had 
a diagnosis of autistic disorder and not Asperger syndrome, which suggest that the 
severity of autism symptoms may play role.
Closed-world reasoning in other cognitive domains
So far we have only discussed exception-handling in the suppression task, but closed- 
world reasoning is presumably involved in other cognitive domains as well. In the 
following, we will discuss three domains that may be important for autism.
First, Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2007; 2008) argued that closed-world reason­
ing is involved in false belief tasks, which investigate reasoning about other people's
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beliefs (theory of mind). In the standard design of the task, a child sees a chocolate 
being moved from a box to a drawer, while a doll called Maxi is taken out of the room 
(Perner, Leekam, & Wimmer, 1987). To understand that Maxi believes that the choco­
late is in the box and not in the drawer, Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2007; 2008) 
suggest that the child must apply closed-world reasoning combined with a principle 
of inertia, i.e. things do not change places spontaneously. A  child must acknowledge 
that Maxi's belief that the chocolate is in the box persists, unless an event occurs 
which causes him to revise his belief. Because no such event has been mentioned, 
one can apply closed-world reasoning and assume that Maxi still believes that the 
chocolate in the box. Like others (Grant, Riggs, & Boucher, 2004; Peterson & Bowler, 
2000; Riggs, Peterson, Robinson, & Mitchell, 1998), Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2007; 
2008) argued that false belief tasks require more than attributing beliefs to others, 
and that ‘logical' reasoning is involved too.
Second, closed-world reasoning appears to be important for executive functions, 
which are known to dysfunction in autism (Hill, 2004a, 2004b; Ozonoff, 1997; Russell, 
1997). For example, Hughes and Russell (1993) found that children with autism had 
great difficulty using the switch-route in their box task. In this task they had to 
retrieve a marble lying on a platform inside a box, but first had to turn a switch 
before reaching inside the box, otherwise an invisible trap-door mechanism was acti­
vated, which made the marble drop out of reach. However, the same children had 
no problems to obtain the marble when they had to push a knob, which caused the 
marble to be caught by a chute. These findings can be explained by a difficulty with 
taking exceptions into account. In the knob-route, the initial rule (“ If I put my hand 
through the opening, I can obtain the marble” ) simply has to be replaced by another 
one (“ If I push the knob, I can obtain the marble” ). However, in the switch-route it is 
not just a matter of replacing one rule by another one, but a precondition must be 
incorporated into the initial rule (“ If the switch is in the correct position and I put my 
hand through the opening, I can obtain the marble” ). Here the child has to take into 
account the possible exception that the switch may not be in the correct position.
Finally, exception-handling appears to be involved in planning, which has also been 
reported to be difficult for people with autism (Ozonoff, 1997; Ozonoff & Jensen, 
1999). Planning requires setting and maintaining a goal. Because it is impossible to 
anticipate all events that might obstruct the achievement of a goal, the best thing to 
do is assume that there are no obstacles as long as none are in evidence, in other 
words, to apply closed-world reasoning to exceptions. However, one must keep open 
the possibility that one has overlooked a possible obstacle, and hence adjust one's 
plan if an obstacle does arise. For example, if I plan a train journey, I will assume there 
is no train strike, power failure, accident and so forth, as long as I have no information 
to the contrary. W e  suggest that it might be the flexible application of closed-world
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reasoning to exceptions that is difficult for people with autism. Since flexible handling 
of exceptions is required in many situations, it is not surprising that people with 
autism often have problems with planning and organizing everyday life, and cling to 
fixed routines and rigid schedules.
Closed-world reasoning and the brain
A  final issue is what implications our findings might have for the neural underpin­
nings of autism. As mentioned before, little is as yet known about logical reasoning 
skills in autism. Therefore, one starting point was to investigate how high-functioning 
adults with autism deal with defeasible inferences at a behavioral level. Conditional 
reasoning is a higher-order cognitive process in which several cognitive components 
are involved such as linguistic processing, recruitment of information from long-term 
memory, maintaining and manipulating verbal information in working memory, atten­
tion and inhibition of responses. Several of these components belong to the so called 
‘executive functions', which have been shown to be an area of dysfunction in autism 
(Hill, 2004a, 2004b; Ozonoff, 1997; Russell, 1997). Executive functions are thought to 
be regulated by the frontal lobes, though evidence is inconsistent (see for a review, 
Alvarez & Emory, 2006). Studies that have investigated the neural basis of reasoning 
found frontal-temporal and frontal-parietal networks involved in deductive reason­
ing (Goel & Dolan, 2004; Knauff, Mulack, Kassubek, Salih, & Greenlee, 2002; Monti, 
Osherson, Martinez, & Parsons, 2007; Parsons & Osherson, 2001).
It is conceivable that defeasible reasoning requires precise collaboration 
between different cortical areas, more than strict rule-bound classical reasoning 
might do. From this perspective, current research on the neural basis of autism has 
provided evidence of functional underconnectivity between cortical areas in autism 
(Courchesne & Pierce, 2005; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, & Minshew, 2007; Just, 
Cherkassky, Keller, & Minshew, 2004). This in effect has consequences for the integra­
tion of information from widespread and diverse regions, and hence presumably for 
defeasible reasoning in which several pieces information must be integrated to arrive 
at a conclusion. Further research is needed to address the question how the autistic 
brain integrates information during the process of reasoning.

chapter 4
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A b strac t
Defeasible inferences are inferences that can be revised in the light of new informa­
tion. Though defeasible inferences are pervasive in everyday communication, little is 
known about how and when they are processed by the brain. This study examined 
the electrophysiological signature of defeasible reasoning using a modified version 
of the suppression task. Participants were presented with conditional inferences 
(of the type “ if p, then q; p, therefore q” ) that were preceded by a congruent or a 
disabling context. The disabling context contained a possible exception or precondi­
tion that prevented people from drawing the conclusion. Acceptability of the conclu­
sion was indeed lower in the disabling condition compared to the congruent condi­
tion. Further, we found a large sustained negativity at the conclusion of the disabling 
condition relative to the congruent condition, which started around 250 ms and was 
persistent throughout the entire epoch. Possible accounts for the observed effect 
are discussed.
This chapter has been based on: Pijnacker, J. , Geurts, B., van Lambalgen, M., Buite­
laar, J.K., Hagoort, P. (in press) Reasoning with exceptions, Journal of cognitive neuro­
science
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In troduction
In everyday communication, the meaning of an utterance usually goes beyond its 
explicit linguistic meaning. For example, take the following situation. I have invited my 
friend for dinner at 7 o'clock. A t 6.45 my telephone rings. It is my friend and he says 
“ I have a flat tire” . To understand his utterance, there is a lot more required than just 
combining word meanings and syntactic structure. Background knowledge and infer­
ences are involved too. As I know that my friend does not have a car, I will infer that 
it is my friend's bike that has a flat tire. Moreover, I might infer that if he has a flat tire, 
he will arrive later. Further, I reason that if he is late, it will be better to turn off the 
oven, otherwise the meal might burn.
Though such inferences are pervasive in everyday communication, little is known 
about how and when they are processed by the brain. This study examines the elec- 
trophysiological signature of everyday inferences. The focus is on one particular form 
of inference, namely conditional inferences, which always have “ If p then q” as one of 
their premises. One classical inference associated with conditionals is modus ponens, 
in which the second premise (1b) confirms the antecedent of the conditional premise 
(1a):
1. a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
b. Mary has an exam.
c. Mary will study in the library.
Most people accept this inference (for a review, see Evans, Newstead, & Byrne, 1993). 
According to classical logic, modus ponens is considered valid, which means that the 
conclusion necessarily follows from the premises. This makes classical logic mono­
tonic: Additional information cannot render an inference invalid if it was valid before. 
However, many studies (e.g. Bonnefon & Hilton, 2002; Byrne, 1989; Byrne, Espino, & 
Santamaria, 1999; Chan & Chua, 1994; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & Rist, 1991; Dieus- 
saert, Schaeken, Schroyens, & d'Ydewalle, 2000; Pijnacker et al., 2009; Politzer & Bour- 
maud, 2002) have found that modus ponens inferences can be suppressed in the light 
of extra information:
2. a. If Mary has an exam, she will study in the library.
b. If the library is open, Mary will study in the library.
c. Mary has an exam.
d. Mary will study in the library.
Byrne et al. (1999) presented this reasoning problem with and without premise (2b). 
As soon as the extra premise (2b) came in, the number of people concluding that
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Mary will study in the library dropped to about 50%, whereas without the extra 
premise most people accepted the conclusion. Thus, addition of an extra premise like 
(2b) leads to a significant decrease of the rate at which a modus ponens inference 
is accepted. This has been called the suppression effect (Byrne, 1989, 1991; Byrne et 
al., 1999). Example (2) clearly illustrates that conditional reasoning is not monotonic, 
but defeasible: New information can cause people to retract an inference. Everyday 
inferences are usually defeasible too. In the above-mentioned example, I reasoned 
that if my friend has a flat tire, he will arrive later, but I will withdraw this inference if 
he tells me that he took a bus.
Although there is an extensive literature on the suppression effect, it is still 
unclear how defeasible inferences are processed in the brain. Event-related brain 
potentials (ERPs) have been proven to be a useful tool for investigating the time 
course of information processing, because they have a good temporal resolution and 
can provide on-line information about cognitive processes. As far as we know, there 
is just one study that examined conditional reasoning using ERPs: Qiu et al. (2007) 
found that conditional inferences elicited a larger negativity than a baseline task 
between 500 and 700 ms, and between 1700 and 2000 ms after onset of the second 
premise. However, it is not clear how much significance we should attach to these 
findings, as the premises were presented in their entirety, and therefore this study 
does not give us a precise idea of the the time course of conditional reasoning.
Perhaps more informative are studies that have used ERPs for investigating the 
processing of linguistic information, as integration of linguistic information is an essen­
tial part of reasoning. One ERP component that is related to linguistic processing is 
the N400 effect, which is a negative shift that has a peak around 400 ms after the 
critical word, and has a centro-parietal scalp distribution. The N400 effect was first 
found for sentences ending with a semantically inappropriate word, like “ He spread 
his warm bread with socks” 1 in contrast to “ He spread his warm bread with butter” 
(Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). Later it was found that the N400 effect also occurs in 
sentences that are semantically appropriate but where words conflict with (i) expec­
tancy, like pocket in “Jenny put the sweet in her mouth / pocket after the lesson” 
(Hagoort & Brown, 1994), (ii) world knowledge, like white in “ Dutch trains are yellow 
/ white and very crowded”2 (Hagoort, Hald, Bastiaansen, & Petersson, 2004), and (iii) 
discourse context, like slow in “As agreed upon, Jane was to wake her sister and her 
brother at five o'clock in the morning. But the sister had already washed herself, and 
the brother had even got dressed. Jane told the brother that he was exceptionally 
quick / slow” (Van Berkum, Brown, & Hagoort, 1999; Van Berkum, Brown, Hagoort,
1. Critical words are in italics.
2. It is a well-known fact that Dutch trains are yellow, and therefore the sentence “ Dutch trains are 
white” is false, though the sentence itself is semantically well-formed.
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& Zwitserlood, 2003). Furthermore, St. George, Mannes, and Hoffman (1997) showed 
that implicit information like bridging inferences affects the N400 amplitude as well. 
In general, the N400 effect is seen as an index of processes involved in the integration 
of the meaning of a word into a representation of its preceding context. As integra­
tion of a word into the context becomes harder because it does not satisfy semantic 
expectations, the amplitude of the N400 increases (Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Van 
Berkum, Hagoort, & Brown, 1999).
Another negative ERP component that has been found in linguistic tasks is the 
sustained negativity. This negative shift occurs in a similar latency window as the 
N400 effect, but is more sustained, does not have a clear peak, and usually has a 
more anterior topography. Sustained negativities have been found in a wide variety 
of linguistic phenomena, though it is less clear how this ERP component should be 
interpreted. For example, Van Berkum et al. (1999; 2003) found a sustained anterior 
negativity when a noun's referent is temporarily ambiguous, like girl in “ David had 
told the two girls to clean up their room before lunchtime. But one of girls had 
stayed in bed all morning, and the other had been on the phone all the time. David 
told the girl that ...” , in contrast to a referentially unambiguous noun. Van Berkum et 
al. (1999; 2003) suggested that the negative shift is due to an extra load on working 
memory, because two possible candidates for a referent must be maintained. Also 
object relative sentences like “ The reporter who the senator attacked admitted the 
error” elicited a sustained negativity compared to subject relative sentences like 
“ The reporter who attacked the senator admitted the error” (King & Kutas, 1995; 
Müller, King, & Kutas, 1997), which may be due to greater working memory load, or 
perhaps to additional processing, because in object relative sentences the head noun 
phrase (“ the reporter” ) has two different grammatical roles. Münte, Schiltz, and Kutas 
(1998) found a sustained anterior negativity for sentences that present events out 
of chronological order, like “ Before the psychologist submitted the article, the jour­
nal changed its policy” relative to “After the psychologist submitted the article, the 
journal changed its policy” . They attributed this effect to additional discourse-level 
computation. Furthermore, Ye and Zhou (2008) demonstrated that participants with 
high cognitive control showed a sustained anterior negativity for implausible active 
sentences like “ The thief kept the policeman in the police station” versus its plausible 
counterpart “ The policeman kept the thief in the police station” . They suggested that 
the sustained negativity may reflect inhibitory processes to suppress a representa­
tion that is in conflict with world knowledge. Finally, Baggio,Van Lambalgen, and Hago­
ort (2008) found a sustained anterior negativity in defeasible inferences. Participants 
read sentences like “ The girl was writing a letter when her friend spilled coffee on 
the paper / tablecloth” . In the case of spilling on the tablecloth, it can be inferred that 
the girl wrote a letter, whereas in the case of spilling on the paper, the inference that
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the girl wrote a letter is suppressed, indicating that the inference is defeasible.
Taken together, though these linguistic phenomena are quite heterogeneous, 
what they appear to have in common is that there are two possible representations 
competing with each other. There are two possible referents for the ambiguous noun 
in Van Berkum et al. (1999; 2003); in object-relative sentences the head noun phrase 
has both a subject and object role; in the Münte et al. (1998) study there may have 
been a default representation of events in chronological order as well as the actual, 
non-chronological order of events; and finally, in Baggio et al. (2008) there is a default 
representation that ‘writing a letter' has a completed letter as goal state, whereas 
the ‘spilling coffee event' requires one to revise this implication. In sum, the sustained 
negativity may reflect recomputation or additional processing required to come up 
with a meaningful representation, or extra working memory load due to multiple 
representations.
The present study
This study was designed to investigate the electrophysiological signature of defeasible 
reasoning by using a modified version of the suppression task (Byrne, 1989). Partici­
pants read modus ponens inferences preceded either by a congruent context or a 
disabling context (see Table 4.1 in Materials section). The disabling context contained 
a possible exception with regard to the conditional, and was introduced to elicit 
suppression of modus ponens.
W e argue that there is a default representation that entails the modus ponens 
inference. However, this representation becomes problematic when the inference is 
preceded by a disabling context, which causes people to consider revising the infer­
ence. This is in line with the framework by Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005; 2008), 
who argued that conditionals may contain a marker for exceptions (for instance, (2a) 
could be interpreted as If Mary has an exam and nothing abnormal is the case, then she 
will study in the library). In the congruent context, people can apply so-called closed- 
world reasoning to exceptions: that is, exceptions are considered to be not the case, 
as long as there is no evidence for any exceptions (i.e. the default representation). 
However, in the disabling context, the original closed-world assumption cannot be 
maintained anymore, because now a possible exception has become salient, namely 
that the library may be closed. This prevents people from drawing the conclusion that 
Mary will study in the library (2d). Hence, modus ponens is suppressed. For a detailed 
description of this framework, see Stenning and Van Lambalgen (2005; 2008).
For the present experiment, we hypothesized that there are two possibilities. 
First, the disabling condition could elicit a discourse-induced semantic N400 effect at 
the conclusion relative to the congruent condition, due to a difficulty with integrating 
the conclusion into the preceding discourse as expectations are not fulfilled. Second,
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the disabling condition could elicit a sustained anterior negativity at the conclusion 
associated with two competing representations: the default representation and the 
revised one incorporating the possible exception.
The aim of this study is to investigate how and when the brain integrates informa­
tion about exceptions that is relevant to arrive at a conclusion. Though we think it is 
most likely that the ERP effect will occur at the final word of the conclusion, because 
it is only at this position that it becomes clear that the conclusion clashes with the 
preceding information, we will also take the final word of the first and second prem­
ise into consideration. To check whether the ERP effect has the signature of a stan­
dard N400 effect, we added two control conditions that consisted of sentences that 
ended with a word that was either semantically congruent or incongruent. Moreover, 
a Reading Span Test was included as an index of verbal working memory performance 
to investigate its role in suppression.
M ethods
Participants
Twenty right-handed participants took part in the study. All participants were native 
speakers of Dutch, had no language disorders, had no known neurological history, and 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Participants were recruited from the Donders 
Institute subject pool. Two participants were excluded from analysis due to an exces­
sive number of artifacts in the EEG signal. The remaining 18 participants (9 males) 
were aged between 19 - 32, and their mean age was 23 years. All participants signed 
informed consent and received reimbursement or course credits for participation. 
The study was approved by the local ethics committee.
Reading Span Test
W e used a computerized Dutch version of the Reading Span Test to measure verbal 
working memory (for a detailed description, see Van den Noort, Bosch, Haverkort, & 
Hugdahl, 2008; Van den Noort, Bosch, & Hugdahl, 2006). Participants had to read aloud 
100 sentences, which appeared on a computer screen. Sentences were presented in 
different set sizes of 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 sentences in random order. When participants had 
finished a sentence, they pressed the space bar for the next sentence to appear. If 
participants could not finish the sentence within 6.5 seconds, then the next sentence 
showed up automatically. After completion of a set of sentences, the word “ recall” 
occurred on the screen. At that point, participants had to recall the final word of 
each sentence in the set (in free order). Participants were instructed to read the 
sentences aloud at normal speed, and to remember the final word of each sentence. 
Reading span was determined as the total number of correctly recalled words.
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Materials ERP experiment
W e created 80 reasoning problems in Dutch. All reasoning problems had the infer­
ence form of modus ponens (if p then q; p, therefore q), and were preceded by a 
congruent context or a disabling context (Table 4.1).
Condition Sentence Example
MP context Lisa probably lost a contact lens
disabling premise 1 If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses
premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey
conclusion Lisa will wear contact lenses
MP context Lisa has recently bought contact lenses
congruent premise 1 If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses
premise 2 Lisa is going to play hockey
conclusion Lisa will wear contact lenses
Table 4.1 Experimental conditions, MP = modus ponens.
The disabling context contained a possible exception or precondition with regard to 
the conditional. Congruent contexts and disabling contexts were kept as similar as 
possible with regard to syntactic structure and sentence length. There were no signif­
icant differences in sentence length between the congruent and disabling contexts (p
> 0.1). Final words of the sentences were never longer than 12 letters to avoid eye 
movements and average final word length was 6.7 letters.
In addition to the 80 experimental reasoning problems, 80 filler reasoning prob­
lems were used, which included 40 modus ponens inferences with an incongruent 
conclusion, 20 affirmation of the consequent inferences with a congruent conclu­
sion and 20 with an incongruent conclusion (see Table 4.2 for examples). All fillers 
were preceded by a congruent context. Fillers were included to reduce the predict­
ability of the materials and to balance for response types (i.e. to evoke ‘maybe' and 
‘no' responses). In total, each participant read 160 reasoning problems: 40 reasoning 
problems in a disabling context, 40 reasoning problems in a congruent context, and 
80 fillers.
The two versions of the reasoning problems were counterbalanced across two 
lists. Thus no participant saw the same reasoning problem more than once. Each list 
was presented to an equal number of participants. Moreover, four versions were 
created in which the order of the items was reversed according to a Latin square 
design. So no reasoning problem always occurred at the same position in the exper-
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Fillers Sentence Example
MP
incongruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Mark lives on a farm far away from the town 
If Mark is going to the town, then he will go by scooter 
Mark is going to the town 
Mark will go by bike
AC
congruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Golf is becoming a popular sport
If Luc is going to play golf, then he will wear a hat
Luc will wear a hat
Luc is going to play golf
AC
incongruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Miriam likes water sports
If Miriam is going to the lake, then she will go rowing 
Miriam will go rowing 
Miriam is going to the forest
Table 4.2 Fillers, MP = modus ponens, A C  = affirmation of the consequent.
iment. Finally, reasoning problems were presented in pseudo-random order with the 
constraint that the same condition never occurred more than twice in a row.
In addition, we included two control conditions in which semantic congruency 
was manipulated in order to elicit a standard N400 effect. These additional two 
conditions contained 80 Dutch sentences that ended with a word that was either 
semantically congruent (40 items) or incongruent (40 items), like, “ Finally the climb­
ers reached the top of the mountain / tulip” . Materials were taken from a previous 
study by Van den Brink, Brown, and Hagoort (2001). Final words were matched for 
number of letters and frequency. Mean cloze probability3 of the sentences was 94% 
(range 80 - 100%). As in the reasoning conditions, two different stimulus lists were 
created to counterbalance congruency so that no participant saw the same item 
more than once. Each stimulus list was presented to an equal number of participants. 
Moreover, four versions were created in which the order of the items was reversed 
according to a Latin square design. So no sentence always occurred at the same posi­
tion in the experiment. Finally, congruent and incongruent sentences were presented 
in pseudo-random order with the constraint that the same condition never occurred 
more than three times in a row.
3. Cloze probability is determined by measuring the probability that a particular word is given on a 
sentence completion task. The higher the cloze probability, the more a particular word is expected.
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Procedure
After participants had completed the Reading Span Test, the electrodes were placed 
on the scalp. Participants received written instructions in which they were instructed 
that they had to decide whether a conclusion followed from short stories. They 
were instructed to read all sentences carefully and to respond by pressing one of 
the buttons ‘yes', ‘no', or ‘maybe' on a button box. Participants were instructed to sit 
quietly in a comfortable position and not to blink during the word-by-word presen­
tation of the sentences. Stimuli were presented in a white font against a black back­
ground, using Presentation 10.2 software.
The materials were partly presented in whole sentences and partly word-by- 
word when good time-locking was critical. The trial sequence was as follows (Figure 
4.1).
+ C o n tex t Prem ise 1a Prem ise 1b Prem ise 2 # # # Conclusion Response
3000 2000 + 250w 600 1000 + 250w 300 word-by-word 1000 word-by-word 1000 300 word-by-word 1000 4000
Lisa probably 
lost a contact 
lens.
If Lisa is going 
to  play hockey 
then
she | will | w ear 
| contact 
lenses.
Lisa | is | going
1 to  1 play  1
hockey.
Lisa | will | 
w ea r |contact 
lenses.
Figure 4.1 Setup of how stimuli were presented. Times are in milliseconds, w  stands for 
word length per sentence, white boxes represent blank screens. Premise 1b, 
premise 2 and the conclusion were presented word-by-word for 300 ms + 
300 ms interstimulus interval per word.
Each trial started with a 3000 ms fixation cross (+) on the screen. Then the context 
sentence was presented for a duration of 2000 ms plus an additional 250 ms times 
the number of words. After the context sentence, the first part of the conditional
(“ If__ then” ) appeared for 2000 ms plus an additional 250 ms times the number
of words. Subsequent sentences were presented word-by-word. Each word was 
displayed for 300 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 300 ms, after which the 
next word appeared. The conclusion was preceded by three hedges (###) to indicate 
that the conclusion was following. After the final word of the conclusion, there was 
a 1000 ms blank screen before the response options MAYBE - YES - N O  appeared 
on the screen for 4000 ms. There were blank screens between sentences. Reason­
ing problems were presented in blocks of ten trials. After each block there was an 
optional break. The session started with a practice block of ten reasoning problems 
to familiarize the participant with the procedure.
After the reasoning problems, the control conditions were presented in serial 
visual presentation (300 ms + 300 ms interstimulus interval, and a 3000 ms fixation 
cross between sentences). Participants were instructed to read for comprehension 
only, and to minimize eye blinks during the word-by-word presentation. No addi­
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tional task demands were imposed. There were five blocks of sentences with optional 
breaks in between. The whole EEG session lasted approximately 75 minutes without 
breaks.
EEG recording
The EEG was recorded from 29 electrode sites across the scalp using an Easycap 
with Ag/AgCl-electrodes. Recordings were referenced to the left mastoid. Three 
additional electrodes were placed to monitor eye movements. Vertical EOG  was 
recorded by placing an electrode below the right eye and FPI was used for above the 
eye. Horizontal EOG was recorded via a right-to-left canthal montage. All EEG and 
EOG  channels were amplified with BrainAmp DC amplifiers, using a band-pass filter 
from 10 s to 125 Hz. The EEG and EOG  signals were recorded and digitized using 
Brain Vision Recorder software with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. Impedances 
were kept below 10 kQ for EOG and below 5 kQ for all other channels.
Data analysis
Both behavioral responses and ERPs were analyzed. Because each condition consisted 
of 40 items, percentages of accepted items (‘yes' responses) per condition were calcu­
lated. A  nonparametric Mann-Whitney test (exact, two-tailed) was used to examine 
whether responses were different across contexts.
Prior to analyzing, EEG data were preprocessed using Brain Vision Analyzer soft­
ware. EEG data were re-referenced to the mean of the two mastoids, and corrected 
for eye movement artifacts using an algorithm described by Gratton, Coles, and 
Donchin (1983). Data were filtered off-line with a 30 Hz low-pass filter. Data were 
segmented from 150 ms before to 1000 ms after the onset of the critical words (final 
words of premise I, premise 2, and conclusion). Baseline correction used the 150 
ms interval preceding the onset of the critical word. Trials containing artifacts were 
rejected (in total 11%).
For each participant, average waveforms were computed across all remaining 
trials per condition. The average waveforms were analyzed over the 1000 ms latency 
window using a cluster-based random permutation procedure, implemented in the 
Fieldtrip toolbox (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007), which has the advantage that it controls 
for type-I error rates involving multiple comparisons. In this procedure, clusters are 
identified that differ significantly between conditions in the temporal and/or spatial 
domain. Specifically, t-statistics were computed for each data point, and a clustering 
algorithm formed clusters of data points based on significant t-tests between condi­
tions in a contrast. For each cluster a cluster-level statistic was calculated by taking 
the sum of all the individual t-statistics within that cluster. The type-I error rate was 
controlled by evaluating the cluster-level statistics under a randomization null distri­
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bution of the maximum cluster-level statistic. This randomization null distribution 
was obtained by randomizing the data between the two conditions across partici­
pants in 1000 randomizations. For each of these randomizations, cluster-level statis­
tics were computed and the largest cluster-level statistics was entered into the null 
distribution. Finally, the actually observed cluster-level statistic was compared against 
the randomization null distribution. Clusters that had a p-value below 0.05 were 
considered significant. The procedure is more fully described in Maris and Oosten- 
veld (2007), as well as in the documentation available at http://www.ru.nl/fcdonders/ 
fieldtrip.
Results
Behavioral results
Reading span scores ranged from to 44 to 86 (M = 68, SD = 10.2). On the reasoning 
problems, participants accepted significantly fewer inferences in the disabling context 
than in the congruent context (U = 28.5, p < .001, Figure 4.2). A  Pearson's correlation 
revealed no significant correlation between reading span and percentage of accepted 
inferences (p > .10).
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congruent context disabling context
Figure 4.2 Percentage of accepted inferences (‘yes' responses) 
for the congruent context and the disabling context. 
Error bars represent I  S.E. of the means.
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Fz Cz Pz
A. First premise
B. Second premise
C. Conclusion
D. Control conditions (N400)
Figure 4.3 Grand average ERPs from Fz, Cz and Pz for the congruent and disabling context 
time-locked to the final word of premise I (A), premise 2 (B), and conclusion (C) 
Black line = congruent context, grey line = disabling context. Figure 3D displays 
the grand average ERPs for the control conditions time-locked to the sentence- 
final word. Here black line = congruent sentence, grey line = incongruent 
sentence. Negative values are plotted upward.
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ERP results
Figure 4.3A - 4.3C (p.73) displays the grand average ERPs of the disabling and congru­
ent condition time-locked to the onset of the last word of the first premise, the 
second premise, and the conclusion.Visual inspection of the waveforms shows a clear 
N I followed by P2, which are characteristic for visual stimuli. Figure 4.3C reveals a 
negative shift at the conclusion of the disabling condition relative to the congruent 
condition.
In the statistical comparisons, this negative shift was expressed by a large, signifi­
cant negative cluster (p < .001). This cluster was present from about 250 to 1000 
ms (see Figure 4.4A), and was most pronounced at the central regions (Figure 4.5A, 
p.75). There were no other significant clusters found for the contrast. Moreover, 
statistical analysis of the ERPs time-locked to the final words of the first and second 
premise did not reveal any significant clusters (p’s > .10).
W e  looked for correlations between the negative shift and the percentage of 
accepted inferences, as well as between the negative shift and reading span, in the 
latency window from 250 to 1000 ms using the mean amplitude difference of central 
electrodes (FCz, FC I, FC2, Cz, C P I, and CP2), based on the topographical distribu-
Fz Cz Pz
A. Conclusion
B. Control condition (N400)
Figure 4.4 Difference waveform of the reasoning conditions (A) time-locked to the final 
word of the conclusion, and of the control conditions (B) time-locked to the 
sentence-final word. Grey blocks represent significant areas. Negative values 
are plotted upward.
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A. Conclusion (sustained negativity)
[0 - 250 ms] [250 - 500 ms] [500 -750 ms] [750 - 1000 ms]
B. Control conditions (N400 effect)
[0 - 250 ms] [250 - 500 ms] [500 - 750 ms] [750 - 1000 ms]
Figure 4.5 Scalp distribution of the sustained negativity at the conclusion in the reasoning 
conditions (A), and of the N400 effect in the control conditions (B). Scalp 
distributions are based on mean amplitude differences in 4 consecutive time 
intervals of 250 ms length. Scale values are in |j V. See p. 134 for color figure.
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tion of the effect. There was neither a significant correlation between the negative 
shift and the percentage of accepted inferences nor a correlation between the nega­
tive shift and reading span (p’s > .10).
Figure 4.3D (p.73) displays the grand average ERPs of the control conditions 
containing semantically congruent and incongruent final words. These waveforms 
also show a NI-P2 complex, and a clear negative shift for the incongruent sentences 
relative to congruent sentences with a peak around 400 ms. Cluster-based statistics 
indeed found a significant, negative cluster (p = .001), which was present from about 
260 to 470 ms (see Figure 4.4B, p.74), and was maximal over the centro-posterior 
region (Figure 4.5B). Furthermore, a late positive cluster was found where the incon­
gruent condition was more positive than the congruent condition, emerging after 
approximately 500-600 ms (p = .016). W e  will further disregard this late positive 
cluster as the aim was to elicit a standard N400 effect (for a review on late posi­
tive components in N400 paradigms, see Van Petten & Luka, 2006). Based on its 
latency window and topographical distribution, it is clear that the negative cluster is 
an instance of a standard N400 effect.
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Discussion
The aim of the present work was to investigate the time course of defeasible reason­
ing in the brain. For that purpose, ERPs were recorded while participants read modus 
ponens inferences, which were preceded by a congruent context or a disabling 
context that contained a possible exception that could prevent people from drawing 
the conclusion. W e  indeed found that people accepted considerably fewer inferences 
in the disabling condition than in the congruent condition. The ERP findings showed 
that the disabling condition elicited a widely distributed sustained negativity relative 
to its congruent counterpart. This negativity started around 250 ms after onset of the 
final word of the conclusion and was persistent throughout the entire epoch. Partici­
pants also read an additional set of control sentences, in which semantic congruency 
was manipulated in order to elicit a standard N400 effect, which was indeed found, 
followed by a late positive component for words that were semantically anomalous 
with the prior sentence relative to semantically congruent words.
It is clear that the observed negativity in the reasoning conditions differs from 
the standard N400 effect in the control conditions in terms of its morphology and 
temporal profile: a peak is lacking and the effect is much more sustained than a stan­
dard N400 effect. This suggests that the effect evoked by the reasoning conditions is 
different from that elicited by semantic anomalies. However, the scalp distribution of 
the effects was very similar. Hence, the sustained negativity may reflect the contribu­
tion of the same neural processes as the N400 effect.
Based on other studies that have observed sustained negativities, the observed 
negativity in the reasoning conditions might reflect additional processing because a 
default inference must be revised to incorporate an exception. This explanation is 
supported by Baggio, Van Lambalgen, and Hagoort (2008), who also found a sustained 
negativity when a default inference had to be overridden and revised, albeit that the 
scalp distribution of the observed effect in our study was more central than in their 
study. Alternatively, the sustained negativity may reflect an attempt to link the excep­
tion with information retrieved from long-term memory, or extra working memory 
demands to hold information about the exception in mind in order to withdraw the 
conclusion (Markovits & Potvin, 2001; Rosler, Heil, & Glowalla, l993;Vadeboncoeur & 
Markovits, 1999). However, the working memory account seems less likely, because 
we failed to find any relationship between reading span and suppression, and between 
reading span and the ERP effect. Reading span is usually taken as a measure for 
verbal working memory capacity (Van den Noort et al., 2008). Although the current 
evidence does not support any associations between verbal working memory capac­
ity and defeasible reasoning, some caution is required when excluding the working 
memory account. Because reading span is solely based on the storage and active 
recall of words, it may not be a good index of the kind of verbal working memory 
involved in defeasible reasoning (Waters & Caplan, 1996).
R eason ing  w ith  ex ce p tio n s 77
As mentioned above, it is not clear whether the observed sustained negativity 
is different from a standard N400 effect, because it had a scalp distribution that is 
similar to that of a standard N400 effect. The N400 effect is usually associated with 
interpretive problems: As the integration of the meaning of a word into a representa­
tion of its preceding context becomes harder, the amplitude of the N400 increases. 
If the sustained negativity is indeed an instance of an N400 effect, then it appears to 
be associated with interpretive problems. One could argue that the reasoning condi­
tions show a large overlap with “ discourse-N400” conditions, in the sense that a 
number of sentences have to be integrated to arrive at a discourse-level representa­
tion. However, several studies have shown that words that conflicts with the wider 
discourse elicit a standard N400 effect instead of a sustained negativity (Nieuwland 
& Van Berkum, 2006; Salmon & Pratt, 2002; Van Berkum, Hagoort et al., 1999; Van 
Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & Brown, 2003). In the light of this evidence, it seems 
less likely that the observed sustained effect is due to difficulties with the integration 
of the conclusion into the preceding discourse. Moreover, the sustained nature of the 
negativity also makes it unlikely that it could be attributed only to a conflict between 
the context and the conclusion while ignoring the premises. In that case, a more 
discourse-like N400 would have been expected. Perhaps the observed effect is more 
sustained because the processes that are involved in defeasible reasoning are more 
demanding than in a “ discourse-N400” paradigm. In a recent study, Baggio et al. (in 
press) found a similar sustained central negativity for coercion verbs like to begin in 
“ The journalist began the article before his coffee break” compared to “ The journal­
ist wrote the article before his coffee break” . The first sentence requires the reader 
to infer what is actually meant by began. Thus coercion verbs involve some semantic 
enrichment, which seems to require additional processing. Baggio and et al. (in press) 
suggest that the sustained central negativity - or “ N400-like shift” - they observed, 
may be associated with more complex, inference-driven integration of information 
into a semantic representation. In a similar way, the observed sustained negativity 
in the present study could also reflect more complex, inference-driven interpretive 
processes, resulting in a sustained N400-like effect.
In conclusion, up to now little was known about the time course of defeasible 
reasoning in the brain. Our work demonstrates that just within 250 ms after the 
onset of the final word of the conclusion there was an electrophysiological brain 
response observed when the conclusion does not fit with the context, which was 
persistent throughout the entire epoch. The observed effect differed from that of 
semantic anomaly at least in its morphology and temporal profile. However, we 
cannot conclude that the effect is qualitatively different from a standard N400 effect, 
because both effects had a central scalp distribution. Importantly, regardless of the 
exact nature of the observed sustained negativity, the processing of defeasible infer­
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ences seems to be more effortful than default inferences. Because this ERP study 
on reasoning was done in a largely unexplored field, the exact interpretation of the 
observed effect remains open. Further research is needed to disentangle processes 
related to reasoning from linguistic processes.
chapter 5
Exceptions and anomalies: 
an ERP study on context sensitivity in autism
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A b strac t
Several studies have demonstrated that people with ASD  and intact language skills 
still have problems processing linguistic information in context. Given this evidence 
for reduced sensitivity to linguistic context, the question arises how contextual infor­
mation is actually processed by people with ASD. In this study, we used event-related 
brain potentials (ERPs) to examine context sensitivity in high-functioning adults with 
autistic disorder (HFA) and Asperger syndrome at two levels: at the level of sentence 
processing and of solving reasoning problems.We found that sentence context as well 
as reasoning context had an immediate ERP effect in adults with Asperger syndrome, 
as in matched controls. Both groups showed a typical N400 effect and a late positive 
component for the sentence conditions, and a sustained negativity for the reasoning 
conditions. In contrast, the HFA group demonstrated neither an N400 effect nor 
a sustained negativity. However, the HFA group showed a late positive component 
which was larger for semantically anomalous sentences than congruent sentences. 
Because sentence context had a modulating effect in a later phase, semantic integra­
tion is perhaps less automatic in HFA, and presumably more elaborate processes are 
needed to arrive at a sentence interpretation.
This chapter has been based on: Pijnacker, J. , Geurts, B., van Lambalgen, M., Bui­
telaar, J.K., Hagoort, P., Exceptions and anomalies: an ERP study on context sensitivity in 
autism (manuscript in revision)
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In troduction
Autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are characterized by deficits in social interac­
tion and communication, and by restrictive, stereotyped and repetitive behaviors 
and narrow interests (DSM-IV, 1994). Both Asperger syndrome and autistic disorder 
belong to ASD, and are characterized by similar features but differ in early language 
development (DSM-IV, 1994). One core feature of ASD are deficits in pragmatic 
language, which include difficulties in understanding non-literal language like irony 
and metaphors (Dennis, Lazenby, & Lockyer, 2001; Happé, 1993; Martin & McDonald, 
2004; Ozonoff & Miller, 1996). A  possible account for such deficits is that people with 
ASD  find it difficult to use context when computing meaning.
It has been demonstrated that individuals with autistic disorder or Asperger 
syndrome who have intact language skills, still have problems processing linguistic 
information in context (Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). In a homograph 
task, they failed to use sentence context to derive the appropriate pronunciation of 
the homographs, for instance, when they had to pronounce the homograph tear in a 
sentence like “ In her dress/eye there was a big tear” (Frith & Snowling, 1983; Happé, 
1997; Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999). They were also found to be less able to use 
contextual information to make a global inference in a sentence arrangement task, 
were less likely to choose a bridging inference to make a scenario coherent if they 
had to select from a list of alternatives, and were less able to use context to interpret 
ambiguous sentences (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000). These findings indicate 
that people with ASD have difficulty understanding language in context. Moreover, 
of the two subgroups, people with autistic disorder had greater difficulty in using 
contextual information than people with Asperger syndrome (Jolliffe & Baron-Cohen, 
1999, 2000). It has been argued that these findings support the weak central coher­
ence account of ASD, which claims that people with ASD have a processing bias for 
details at the expense of the global picture (Frith, 2003; Happé, 1999; Happé & Frith, 
2006). Given this evidence for reduced sensitivity to linguistic context, the question 
arises how contextual information is actually processed by people with ASD.
In the present work we used event-related brain potentials (ERPs) to exam­
ine context sensitivity in high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (HFA) and 
Asperger syndrome. ERPs have the advantage that they have good temporal resolu­
tion, and therefore can provide precise information about the time course of cogni­
tive processes. Thus ERPs can give us more insight into when particular information 
is processed in the brain. W e  investigated the notion of context sensitivity in autism 
at two levels: at the level of sentence processing and of solving reasoning problems. 
In the following sections, we will introduce these topics in greater detail.
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Integrating words into context - the N400 effect
In ERP research a component called N400 (a negative deflection around 400 ms) 
has been proven to be a good tool to examine the online integration of linguistic 
information. An N400 is elicited by every content word, but its strength varies as a 
function of the degree of semantic fit between a word and its context. This context 
could be established by a word (Holcomb, Reder, Misra, & Grainger, 2005; Rugg, 
1985), a sentence (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980, 1984), or a larger discourse (Van Berkum, 
Hagoort, & Brown, 1999; Van Berkum, Zwitserlood, Hagoort, & Brown, 2003). For 
example, it is well-known that semantically anomalous sentences like “ He spread his 
warm bread with socks” elicit a larger N400 after the onset of the anomalous word 
socks compared to the congruent word butter (Kutas & Hillyard, 1980). In general, 
the N400 effect is seen as an index of processes involved in the integration of the 
meaning of a word into a representation of its preceding context. As integration of a 
word into the context becomes harder because it does not satisfy semantic expecta­
tions, the amplitude of the N400 increases (Brown & Hagoort, 1993; Van Berkum et 
al., 1999).
Currently, evidence for N400 effects in autism is equivocal. For example, children 
with ASD failed to show any N400 effect when they had to detect words whose 
semantic category deviated from others in the same set, e.g., non-animal words in 
a set of animal words (Dunn & Bates, 2005; Dunn, Vaughan, Kreuzer, & Kurtzberg, 
1999). One limitation of these studies is that they failed to match the ASD  children 
and the control children on intelligence and verbal abilities. That is, the absence of an 
N400 effect might be attributed to impaired verbal abilities or lower intelligence, and 
not to the autistic condition itself. Other research demonstrated that children with 
autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome had a similar N400 amplitude as controls 
for incongruent versus congruent word pairs, though in the children with autistic 
disorder the N400 effect was delayed (Méndez, Sans, Abril, & Valdizan, 2009; Valdizan 
et al., 2003). In adults with ASD, Strandburg et al. (1993) also found a clear N400 
effect for meaningless word pairs relative to meaningful word pairs (e.g. square wind 
/ vicious dog). Also at sentence level, an N400-like effect was found when adults with 
ASD read semantically incongruent sentences while MEGs were recorded, but there 
were differences in spatial distribution between the ASD  group and control group 
(Braeutigam, Swithenby, & Bailey, 2008).
In the present study, we used highly constraining sentences to investigate the 
time course of linguistic integration in high-functioning adults with ASD. By ‘highly 
constraining' we mean sentences that strongly drive semantic expectations about the 
upcoming final word, for instance, “ Finally the climbers reached the top of the ...” . 
It is known that when listening to or reading such a constraining sentence, people 
very rapidly make specific predictions about the continuation of the sentence, as
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the sentence unfolds. When semantic expectations are violated (“ ... tulip” ), then an 
N400 effect occurs relative to the expected word (“ ... mountain” ). W e  hypothesized 
that if high-functioning adults with ASD make less use of sentence context and focus 
more on the meaning of the individual words, their semantic expectations might be 
less strong, which should give rise to reduced N400 effects.
Previously we found remarkable differences between adults with Asperger 
syndrome and high-functioning adults with autistic disorder (HFA) in a pragmatic 
inference task (Pijnacker, Hagoort, Buitelaar, Teunisse, & Geurts, 2009). Moreover, 
as mentioned above, it may be that online semantic processing is delayed in autistic 
disorder, but not in Asperger syndrome (Méndez et al., 2009; Valdizan et al., 2003). 
Furthermore, it has been shown that individuals with autistic disorder have greater 
difficulty in achieving coherence than individuals with Asperger syndrome (Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999, 2000). Because adults with HFA and Asperger syndrome may 
differ in the way they process linguistic information, we will also explore whether 
these subgroups differ in semantic processing.
Defeasible reasoning - taking exceptions into account
A  further aim of the present work was to examine how high-functioning people with 
ASD  make use of context information when reasoning with conditionals. Condition­
als are of the type “ If P, then Q ” . A  characteristic feature of everyday conditional 
inferences is that they allow for exceptions. In other words, conditional inferences 
are defeasible: they can be revised in the light of new information. Exceptions to 
conditional inferences are quite common in everyday life. For instance, we expect a 
lamp to light if we switch it on, but we will withdraw this inference if the lamp turns 
out to be broken. Because one has to adjust one's conclusions when the context 
changes, mental flexibility seems to be necessary for defeasible reasoning (Pijnacker, 
Geurts et al., 2009).
In a previous behavioral study, we found that high-functioning adults with ASD 
were good at conditional reasoning, but were less sensitive to exceptions that 
prevent a conclusion from being drawn, compared to matched controls (Pijnacker, 
Geurts et al., 2009). W e  suggested that it is exception-handling that is the difficult 
part of defeasible reasoning for people with ASD. Exception-handling requires that 
we ignore possible exceptions as long as there is no evidence thereof. That is, we 
apply a so-called closed-world assumption with regard to exceptions. For instance, in 
“ If I switch the lamp on and nothing abnormal is the case, then it will light” , we assume 
that there is indeed nothing abnormal the case as long as we have no evidence for 
exceptions (Pijnacker, Geurts et al., 2009; for a detailed description, see Stenning & 
Van Lambalgen, 2005; 2008). However, if an exception becomes salient - e.g. a broken 
lamp -, then the original closed-world assumption cannot be maintained anymore.
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This may prevent people from drawing the conclusion that the lamp will light. The 
important thing is that one must disregard all possible exceptions as long as there is 
no evidence thereof (i.e. apply the closed-world assumption), but adjust the closed- 
world assumption when the context changes. Given the evidence of impaired excep­
tion-handling in ASD, the question arises how defeasible inferences are processed in 
the brain by people with ASD.
In this study we employed a paradigm that we previously used to explore the 
electrophysiological signature of defeasible reasoning in a group of college students 
(Pijnacker, Geurts,Van Lambalgen, Buitelaar, & Hagoort, in press), and which is a modi­
fied version of the suppression task (Byrne, 1989, 1991). Participants were visually 
presented with modus ponens inferences. Modus ponens is a simple argument form, 
which has two premises. The first premise is the conditional If P, then Q, which 
states that P implies Q. The second premise asserts the first part of the conditional 
(P). From these two premises we can logically conclude that the consequent of the 
conditional (Q ) must be true (for examples, see Table 5.2 in the Materials section). 
Inferences were preceded either by a congruent context or a disabling context. The 
disabling context contained a possible exception with regard to the conditional, and 
was introduced to elicit suppression of modus ponens. Thus it was the context that 
was decisive for whether a conclusion was drawn or not. It is important to note that 
in the original suppression task (Byrne, 1989, 1991; but also see Pijnacker, Geurts et 
al., 2009) possible exceptions were presented in the form of a conditional. In order 
to enable good time-locking to critical words, we had to modify the original task in 
such a way that the presentation of exceptions became more explicit. As we will see 
later, this may have had an effect on participants' performance.
In a group of college students (n=l8) we found that an electrophysiological brain 
response occurred just within 250 ms when a conclusion can be withdrawn because 
of a possible exception (Pijnacker et al., in press). W e  observed a widely distributed 
sustained negativity from about 250 ms until the end of the epoch at the final word 
of the conclusion in the disabling context relative to the congruent context. The 
observed negativity differed from that of semantic anomaly at least in its morphology 
and temporal profile. However, we could not conclude that the effect is qualitatively 
different from a N400 effect, because it had a N400-like central scalp distribution. W e 
suggested that the observed negativity could reflect additional processing, because a 
default inference must be revised to incorporate an exception. Alternatively, it could 
be associated with more complex, inference-driven interpretive processes (Pijnacker 
et al., in press).
In the present study, we applied the above described ERP paradigm to people 
with ASD  and matched controls, following up on the earlier behavioral findings that 
high-functioning adults with ASD are less sensitive to exceptions when reasoning
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with conditionals (Pijnacker, Geurts et al., 2009). W e  explored how high-functioning 
people with autistic disorder (HFA) and adults with Asperger syndrome make use 
of context information when reasoning with conditionals compared to matched 
controls.
M ethods
Participants
Twenty high-functioning adults with ASD  participated in this study, of whom 18 were 
included in the final analysis (11 males). Two participants with ASD  were excluded due 
to low signal quality. The ASD  group consisted of two subgroups based on DSM-IV 
criteria: a group of participants with Asperger syndrome (n=l2) and a group of high- 
functioning participants with autistic disorder (n=6, henceforth HFA).
The diagnoses of autistic disorder and Asperger syndrome were established 
through expert clinical evaluation based on the DSM-IV criteria for these disor­
ders (DSM-IV, 1994). Clinical diagnosis was supplemented with the Autism Diagnostic 
Interview - Revised (ADI-R), which is a structured developmental diagnostic inter­
view with parents or caregivers, and is based on behavior of the participant at the 
age of 4-5 years (Lord, Rutter, & Le Couteur, 1994). Two participants did not meet 
the onset cutoff, and two participants scored below the cut-off on one of the other 
scales. This could be attributed to the fact that their parents could not recall the 
relevant developmental information. For four participants no parents or caretakers 
were available, and hence the ADI-R could not be administered. In all these cases, 
the clinical diagnosis of autism was beyond doubt, meaning that they satisfied the full 
DSM-IV criteria for autistic disorder or Asperger syndrome, established by thorough 
clinical assessment by experts People with a PDD-NOS diagnosis were excluded as 
well as those with severe comorbid axis-I conditions like major depressive disorder, 
anxiety disorders, or ADHD.
Data of the ASD  subgroups were compared to data of 18 matched controls 
(11 males). For inclusion, control participants were screened to exclude those with 
psychiatric, neurological or developmental disorders. There were no significant differ­
ences between the groups with respect to age and intelligence scales (verbal, perfor­
mance and full scale intelligence) as assessed by the Wechsler Intelligence Scales (see 
Table 5.1 p.86, p > .10 for all variables). All participants were right-handed native 
speakers of Dutch, and had normal or corrected-to-normal vision. All participants 
signed an informed consent form, and received reimbursement for participation. The 
study was approved by the local medical ethics committee.
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Control (n = 18) Asperger(n = 12) HFA (n = 6)
M (SD) range M (SD) range M (SD) range
Age 8
(N 28 (6) 20 -42 31 (7) 24 - 40
V IQ 118 (8) 105 - 135 123 (13) 100 - 142 116 (10) 103 - 128
PIQ 122 (10) 104 - 138 116 (11) 101 - 130 120 (15) 104 -144
FIQ 121 (7) 108 - 139 122 (12) 101 - 140 119 (10) 109 - 134
Table 5.1 Description of the matching variables. M=mean, SD=standard deviation.
Materials
The sentence conditions consisted of 80 Dutch sentences that ended with a word 
that was either semantically incongruent (40 items) or congruent (40 items) with the 
preceding sentence context, like, “ Finally the climbers reached the top of the tulip 
/ mountain” . Materials were taken from a previous study by Van den Brink, Brown, 
and Hagoort (2001). Final words were matched for number of letters and frequency. 
Mean cloze probability1 of the sentences was 94% (range 80 - 100%). Two different 
stimulus lists were created to counterbalance congruency so that no participant saw 
the same item more than once. Each stimulus list was presented to an equal number 
of participants in the control group as well as in the ASD group.
For the reasoning conditions, we created 80 reasoning problems in Dutch. All 
reasoning problems had the inference form of modus ponens (If P then Q; P there­
fore Q). Reasoning problems were preceded by a congruent context or a disabling 
context (Table 5.2, p.87). The disabling context contained a possible exception or 
precondition with regard to the conditional. Congruent contexts and disabling 
contexts were kept as similar as possible with regard to syntactic structure and 
sentence length. There were no significant differences in sentence length between the 
congruent and disabling contexts (p > .10). Final words of the sentences were never 
longer than 12 letters to avoid eye movements and average final word length was 6.7 
letters.
In addition to the 80 experimental reasoning problems, 80 filler reasoning prob­
lems were used, which included 40 modus ponens inferences with an incongruent 
conclusion, 20 affirmation of the consequent inferences (AC) with a congruent 
conclusion and 20 with an incongruent conclusion (see Table 5.3 p.87 for examples). 
All fillers were preceded by a congruent context. Fillers were included to reduce the 
predictability of the materials and to balance for response types (i.e. to evoke ‘maybe' 
and ‘no' responses). In total, each participant read 160 reasoning problems:
1. Cloze probability is determined by measuring the probability that a particular word is given 
on a sentence completion task. The higher the cloze probability, the more a particular 
word is expected.
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Condition Sentence Example
MP
disabling
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Lisa probably lost a contact lens
If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses 
Lisa is going to play hockey 
Lisa will wear contact lenses
MP
congruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Lisa has recently bought contact lenses
If Lisa is going to play hockey, then she will wear contact lenses 
Lisa is going to play hockey 
Lisa will wear contact lenses
Table S.2 Experimental conditions, MP = modus ponens.
Fillers Sentence Example
MP
incongruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Mark lives on a farm far away from the town 
If Mark is going to the town, then he will go by scooter 
Mark is going to the town 
Mark will go by bike
AC
congruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Golf is becoming a popular sport
If Luc is going to play golf, then he will wear a hat
Luc will wear a hat
Luc is going to play golf
AC
incongruent
context 
premise 1 
premise 2 
conclusion
Miriam likes water sports
If Miriam is going to the lake, then she will go rowing 
Miriam will go rowing 
Miriam is going to the forest
Table 5.3 Fillers, MP = modus ponens, A C  = affirmation of the consequent.
40 reasoning problems in a disabling context, 40 reasoning problems in a congruent 
context, and 80 fillers. As in the sentence conditions, the two versions of the reason­
ing problems were counterbalanced across two lists. Thus no participant saw the 
same reasoning problem more than once. Each list was presented to an equal number 
of participants in the control group as well as in the ASD  group.
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Procedure
The reasoning conditions were presented first, followed by the sentence conditions. 
Participants received written instructions about the reasoning conditions, in which 
they were instructed that they had to decide whether a conclusion followed from 
short stories. They were instructed to read all sentences carefully and to respond by 
pressing one of the buttons ‘yes', ‘no', or ‘maybe' on a button box. Participants were 
instructed to sit quietly in a comfortable position and not to blink during the word- 
by-word presentation of the sentences. Stimuli were presented in a white font against 
a black background, using Presentation 10.2 software.
The reasoning materials were partly presented in whole sentences and partly 
word-by-word when good time-locking was critical. The trial sequence was as follows 
(see Figure 5.1).
+ C o n tex t Prem ise 1a Prem ise 1b Prem ise 2 # # # Conclusion Response
3000 2000 + 250w 600 1000 + 250w 300 word-by-word 1000 word-by-word 1000 300 word-by-word 1000 4000
Lisa probably 
lost a contact 
lens.
If Lisa is going 
to  play hockey 
then
she | will | w ear 
| contact 
lenses.
Lisa | is | going
1 to  1 play  1
hockey.
Lisa | will | 
w ea r |contact 
lenses.
Figure 5.1 Setup of how stimuli were presented. Times are in milliseconds, w  stands for 
word length per sentence, white boxes represent blank screens. Premise 1b, 
premise 2 and the conclusion were presented word-by-word for 300 ms + 
300 ms interstimulus interval per word.
Each trial started with a 3000 ms fixation cross (+) on the screen.Then the context 
sentence was presented for a duration of 2000 ms plus an additional 250 ms times 
the number of words. After the context sentence, the first part of the conditional 
(“ If..., then” ) appeared for 2000 ms plus an additional 250 ms times the number 
of words. Subsequent sentences were presented word-by-word. Each word was 
displayed for 300 ms, followed by a blank screen for another 300 ms, after which the 
next word appeared. The conclusion was preceded by three hedges (###) to indicate 
that the conclusion was following. After the final word of the conclusion, there was 
a 1000 ms blank screen before the response options MAYBE - YES - N O  appeared 
on the screen for 4000 ms. There were blank screens between sentences. Reason­
ing problems were presented in blocks of ten trials. After each block there was an 
optional break. The session started with a practice block of ten reasoning problems 
to familiarize the participant with the procedure.
After the reasoning conditions, the sentence conditions were presented in serial 
visual presentation (300 ms + 300 ms interstimulus interval, and a 3000 ms fixa­
tion cross between sentences for blinks). Participants were instructed to read for 
comprehension only, and to minimize eye blinks during the word-by-word presenta­
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tion. No additional task demands were imposed. There were five blocks of sentences 
with optional breaks in between. The whole EEG session lasted approximately 75 
minutes without breaks.
EEG recording
The EEG was recorded from 29 electrode sites across the scalp using an Easycap 
with Ag/AgCl-electrodes. Recordings were referenced to the left mastoid. Three 
additional electrodes were placed to monitor eye movements. Vertical EOG  was 
recorded by placing an electrode below the right eye, and FPI was used for above the 
eye. Horizontal EOG was recorded via a right-to-left canthal montage. All EEG and 
EOG  channels were amplified using BrainAmp DC amplifiers. A  band-pass filter was 
applied from 0.016 to 125 Hz. The EEG and EOG signals were recorded and digitized 
using Brain Vision Recorder software with a sampling frequency of 500 Hz. Imped­
ances were kept below 10 kQ for EOG  and below 5 kQ for all other electrodes.
Data analysis
For the analysis of the behavioral responses of the reasoning conditions, percentages 
of accepted items (‘yes' responses) per condition were calculated. Because of the 
non-normal distribution of the response data, nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis tests 
(exact, two-sided) were used to examine whether responses were different across 
groups per context.
Prior to analyzing, EEG data were preprocessed using Brain Vision Analyzer soft­
ware. EEG data were re-referenced to the mean of the two mastoids, and corrected 
for eye movement artifacts using an algorithm described by Gratton, Coles, and 
Donchin (1983). Data were filtered off-line with a 30 Hz low-pass filter. Data were 
segmented from 150 ms before to 1000 ms after the critical words (final word in 
the sentence conditions, and final words of premise I, premise 2, and conclusion in 
reasoning conditions). Baseline correction used the 150 ms interval preceding the 
onset of the critical word. Trials containing artifacts (9%) were rejected. Rejected 
trials were equally distributed across conditions and groups (p > .10). For each 
participant, average waveforms were computed across all remaining trials per condi­
tion.
All analyses were conducted on the mean amplitudes of ERPs evoked by the 
critical words over two latency windows based on the N400 literature: a 250-500 
ms latency window (N400 effect), and a 600-900 ms latency window (late posi­
tive component). For good comparison, we used the same latency windows for the 
analysis of the reasoning conditions. The effects were evaluated in repeated measures 
ANOVAs with the factors Context (congruent, incongruent/disabling), Quadrant (left 
anterior, right anterior, left posterior, right anterior), and Group (control, Asperger,
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HFA). Electrodes were assigned to quadrants as follows: left anterior (F3, F7, FC I, 
FC5, C3), right anterior (F4, F8, FC2, FC6, C4), left posterior (C P I, CP5, P3, P7, O I), 
and right posterior (CP2, CP6, P4, P8, O2). Interactions with the factor Quadrant 
were followed up by single quadrant analyses. Separate ANOVAs were conducted 
for the midline electrodes (Fz, FCz, Cz, Pz). Planned comparisons entailed sepa­
rate ANOVAs per group. For all analyses, we applied a Huynh-Feldt correction for 
violations of sphericity when necessary (Huynh & Feldt, 1976). In these cases, the 
corrected p-values with the original degrees of freedom will be reported.
Results
First, we will discuss the group results of the sentence conditions. To gain more 
insight into the variation within the groups, we will also present the individual partici­
pant data. Next, we will discuss the results of the reasoning conditions, for both the 
group data and the individual participant data.
Sentence conditions
Figure 5.2 (p.9I) displays the grand average waveforms of the sentence conditions 
containing semantically congruent and incongruent final words. Visual inspection of 
these waveforms shows for each group a NI-P2 complex, which is characteristic for 
visual stimuli. Furthermore, the control group and the Asperger group demonstrate 
a negative shift for the incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition, 
which appears to be absent in the HFA group. Finally, a late positive component for 
the incongruent condition compared to the congruent condition is apparent in all 
groups.
Statistical analysis in the 250-500 ms latency window demonstrated a main effect 
of Context (F(I,33) = I5.5, p < .00I), a Context by Quadrant interaction (F(3,99) =
6.46, p = .00I), and a Context by Group interaction (F(2,33) = 3.9I, p = .030). The 
midline analysis also revealed a main effect of Context (F(I,33) = I2.9, p = .00I), and 
a marginal Context by Group interaction (F(2,33) = 3.I9, p = .054).
Separate analyses per group in the 250-500 ms latency window demonstrated a 
main effect of Context for both the control group2 (F (I,I7 ) = 26.0, p < .00I) and 
the Asperger group (F (I, I I)=  5.07, p = 0.046). Moreover, the Asperger group
2. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, there are early differences in the N I- P2  complex in the control group. 
statistical comparison revealed that there is indeed an early significant negative effect in the 0-200 
ms latency window, indicating that the incongruent condition is more negative than the congruent 
condition. This early effect was neither present in the A SD  groups nor in the previous college 
students' data. Because the N400 effect in controls could possibly be a consequence of this early 
difference, we checked whether the N400 effect was still present in controls if we took into account 
the unexplained early difference in the 0-200 ms latency window by subtracting the mean amplitude 
in that latency window from each data point. It turned out that the N400 effect in controls remained 
significant when corrected for the early effect (F ( I , I7 )  = 19.0, p <.001 ).
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Figure 5.2 Grand average ERPs (Fz, Cz and Pz) of the congruent and incongruent linguistic 
condition time-locked to the onset of the sentence-final word. The white boxes 
display the latency windows in which the effects were evaluated. Black line = 
congruent condition, grey line = incongruent condition. Negative values are 
plotted upward.
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8
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showed a Context by Quadrant interaction (F(3,33) = 4.91, p = .014). Single quadrant 
analyses indicated that in the Asperger group there was a main effect of Context in 
the right anterior region (F ( l , l l )  = 9.86, p = .009), and a trend for the left anterior 
region (F ( l , l l )  = 4.81, p = 0.051) and the midline region (F ( l , l l )  = 4.19, p = 0.065). 
The HFA group did not show a significant main effect of Context (F(l,5) = l.26, p > 
.l0), but there was a marginal Context by Quadrant interaction (F(3,l5) = 3.l5, p = 
.056). However, the analyses for the separate quadrants and midline failed to show 
any significant effects for Context (all p > .09).
The next latency window in which the effects were tested was from 600 to 900 
ms. For this latency window, the repeated measures AN O VA  showed a main effect 
of Context (F(l,33) = 28.0, p < .00l), indicating that the incongruent condition is 
more positive than the congruent condition, and a Context by Quadrant interaction 
(F(3,99) = l4.2, p < .00l). The midline analysis also showed a main effect of Context 
(F(l,33) = 28.0, p < .00l).
Planned comparisons per group confirmed that there is indeed a late positive 
component present in each group (control: F (l,l7 ) = 4.55, p = .048; Asperger: F ( l , l l )  
= l2 .l, p = .005; HFA: F(l,5) = 37.9, p = .002). In addition, in the control group and 
Asperger group a Context by Quadrant interaction was observed (control: F(3,5l) = 
9.l6, p < .00l; Asperger: F(3,33) = l3.0, p < .00l). Single quadrant analyses revealed 
that in both the control group and Asperger group, there was a main effect of Context
Control group Asperger group HFA group
250 - 500 ms
4^V
2
0
-2
-4
Figure 5.3 The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between the 
ERPs evoked by the incongruent linguistic condition relative to the congruent 
linguistic condition time-locked to the sentence-final word, in the latency 
windows 250 - 500 ms and 600 - 900 ms. See p. 135 for color figure.
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in left and right posterior regions (control: F (I,I7 ) = 18.2, p = .001, F (I,I7 ) = 6.38, p 
= .022; Asperger: F ( I , I I )  = 36.7, p < .001, F ( I , I I )  = 15.5, p = .002), and the midline 
region (control: F( I , I7) = 4.56, p = .048; Asperger: F ( I , I I )  = I0.0, p = .009). The topo­
graphical distributions for the Context effects per group can be seen in Figure 5.3.
Figures 5.4 and 5.5 display the N400 effect and the late positive component for 
the sentence conditions per individual participant per group. As can be seen in Figure 
5.4, the majority of the control and Asperger participants demonstrated an N400 
effect for the incongruent condition relative to the congruent condition, but with 
some variation in individual effect sizes. In the HFA group, the N400 effect appears 
to be reduced or absent. In contrast, all HFA participants demonstrated a large late 
positive component for the incongruent condition compared to the congruent condi­
tion, like most control and Asperger participants (Figure 5.5, p.94).
N400 effect at 250-500 ms
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Figure 5.4 Mean amplitude of the N400 effect (incongruent condition minus congruent
condition in latency window 250-500 ms averaged over FCz, Cz, and Pz) for
each individual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
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Late positive component at 600-900 ms
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Figure 5.5 Mean amplitude of the late positive component (incongruent condition minus 
congruent condition in latency window 600-900 ms averaged over FCz, Cz, 
and Pz) for each individual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
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Reasoning conditions
The groups did not differ significantly on the percentage of accepted inferences in the 
congruent condition (H (2) = 1.28, p > .10), as well as in the disabling condition (H(2) 
= 4.20, p > .10), although the H FA  group seems to show more accepted inferences in 
the disabling condition than the Asperger group and control group (see Figure 5.6). 
Separate comparisons between the subgroups for the disabling condition yielded no 
significant effects (H FA  - control: U = 32.5, p = .16; H FA  - Asperger: U = 16.0, p = 
.062).
Figure 5.7 (p.96) displays the grand average waveforms of the congruent and 
disabling condition time-locked to  the onset of the final word of the conclusion. 
Visual inspection of the waveforms shows for each group an N I-P2  complex. M ore­
over, visual inspection reveals a large negative shift for the disabling condition rela­
tive to the congruent condition in the control group and the Asperger group, which 
appears to be reduced in the H FA  group.
Statistical analysis confirmed that in the latency w indow  from 250 to 500 ms, the 
disabling condition was significantly more negative than the congruent condition
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Figure 5.7 Grand average ERPs (Fz, Cz and Pz) of the congruent and disabling reasoning
condition time-locked to the onset of the final word of the conclusion. The white 
boxes display the latency windows in which the effects were evaluated. Black line 
= congruent condition, grey line = disabling condition. Negative values are plotted 
upward.
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Figure 5.8 The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between the 
ERPs evoked by the disabling reasoning condition relative to the congruent 
reasoning condition time-locked to the onset of the final word of the conclusion, 
in the latency windows 250 - 500 ms and 600 - 900 ms. See p. 135 for color figure.
(F (l,33) = 14.6, p = .001). The midline analysis also confirmed an effect of Context 
(F (l,33) = 16.5, p < .001). Planned comparisons per group revealed that both the 
control group and the Asperger group demonstrated a main effect of Context 
(control: F ( l , l7 )  = 15.8, p = .001; Asperger: F ( l , l l )  = 7.96, p = .017). In contrast, the 
H FA  group failed to  show any effect of Context (F (l,5 ) = l.l0 , p > .l0 ).
In the next latency w indow from 600 to 900 ms, the repeated measures A N O V A  
yielded a main effect of Context (F(l,33) = l4.2, p = .00l), and a Context by Quad­
rant interaction (F(3,99) = ll.3 , p < .00l). The midline analysis also showed a main 
effect of Context (F(l,33) = ll.5 , p = .002). Planned comparisons per group revealed 
a main effect of Context for the control group (F ( l, l7 )  = l8.0, p = .00 l) and the 
Asperger g ro u p (F ( l, l l)  = 7.86, p = .0 l7), and a Context by Quadrant interaction in 
both groups (control: F (3 ,5 l) = 6.62, p = .004; Asperger: F(3,33) = 5.73, p = .l0 ). A  
main effect of Context was found for every separate quadrant and for the midline 
region in both groups (all p < .05). In contrast, the H FA  group did not demonstrate 
a main effect of Context (F (l,5 ) < l, p > .l0 ), but there was a significant Context by 
Quadrant interaction (F(3 ,l5 ) = 5.l2, p = .0 l2). However, the analyses for the sepa­
rate quadrants and midline failed to show any significant effects for Context (all p > 
.l0 ). The topographical distributions for the Context effects per group can be seen 
in Figure 5.8.
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Sustained negativity at 250-500 ms
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Figure 5.9 Mean amplitude of the sustained negativity (disabling condition minus congruent 
condition in latency window 250-500 ms averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz) for each 
individual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
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Consistent with previous college students' data, ERPs time-locked to the onset 
of the final word of the first premise and the second premise did not demonstrate 
any significant effects of Context in both latency windows (all p > .10).
Figure 5.9 and 5.10 display the negative shift for the reasoning conditions per 
individual participant per group. As is evident from Figure 5.9 and 5.10, the major­
ity of the control participants and the Asperger participants showed a negative shift 
for the disabling condition compared to  the congruent condition, though with some 
variation in individual effect sizes. In the H FA  group only two out of six participants 
showed a clear negative shift.
Finally, in order to determine to what extent the size of the negative shift in the 
reasoning conditions was related to the behavioral responses, we computed for each 
group a Pearson correlation between the negative shift (mean amplitude difference
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Figure 5.10 Mean amplitude of the sustained negativity (disabling condition minus congruent 
condition in latency window 600-900 ms averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz) for each 
individual participant. Negative values are plotted upward.
averaged over FCz, Cz and Pz, in both latency w indows) and percentage of accepted 
inferences in the disabling condition. It turned out that there were no significant 
correlations between the negative shift and the percentage of accepted inferences 
in the disabling condition for any of the groups (all p > .10), which is consistent with 
previous college students' results.
Discussion
In the present study we explored the online processing of context information - 
sentence context as well as reasoning context - in autism spectrum disorders (ASD), 
following up on behavioral research indicating that people with A SD  fail to  process 
linguistic information in context (Frith &  Snowling, 1983; Happé, 1997; Jolliffe & 
Baron-Cohen, 1999). The first aim was to investigate w hether high-functioning adults
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with autistic disorder (H FA ) and Asperger syndrome make use of sentence context 
to build up semantic predictions about the continuation of the sentence. For this 
purpose, ERPs were recorded while participants read sentences that had a semanti­
cally congruent or an anomalous ending.
The results indicated that sentence context had an immediate ERP effect in 
adults with Asperger syndrome and matched controls. Both groups showed typical 
larger N400 amplitudes for words that were semantically anomalous in the prior 
sentence context than words that were semantically congruent, although the N400 
effect in the Asperger group was more pronounced over the right hemisphere than 
in the control group. In contrast, in the H FA  group sentence context did not appear 
to modulate the ERP brain response immediately, as an N400 effect was absent. 
However, the H FA  group showed a late positive component which was larger for 
semantically anomalous sentences than congruent sentences, like in the control and 
the Asperger group.
Late positive components have been observed more often in N400 paradigms 
(Coulson &  Van Petten, 2002; Holcomb, l988; Juottonen, Revonsuo, &  Lang, l996; 
Salmon &  Pratt, 2002; Severens &  Hartsuiker, 2009; Van de Meerendonk, Kolk, Viss­
ers, &  Chwilla, 20 l0), but have not consistently found across studies (e.g. Hagoort, 
Hald, Bastiaansen, &  Petersson, 2004; Kutas &  Hillyard, l980, l984; Van Berkum et 
al., l999). There is a lack of consensus about the functional interpretation of this 
late positive component, but it seems to have a different role than the N400 effect 
(Juottonen et al., l996; Salmon &  Pratt, 2002). Several accounts allude to processes 
related to  semantic memory, e.g. extensive retrieval of information from seman­
tic memory in the course of arriving at an interpretation (Coulson &  Van Petten, 
2002), extended retrieval from semantic memory and updating the contents of w ork ­
ing memory with the retrieved information (Van Petten, Kutas, Kluender, Mitchiner, 
&  McIsaac, l9 9 l), an attention-demanding process after more automatic semantic 
memory processes (Juottonen et al., l996), o r active search in semantic memory 
due to violations of expectations (Schwartz, Kutas, Butters, Paulsen, &  Salmon, l996). 
O thers have suggested that the late positive component might be indicative of a 
delayed and more elaborate interpretive process (Nieuwland &  Van Berkum, 2005), 
o r post-lexical processes (Holcomb, l988). Finally, the late positive component has 
been argued to be an index of a monitoring process that triggers reanalysis when 
integration fails (Severens &  Hartsuiker, 2009; Van de Meerendonk et al., 20l0).
The question that arises is why the H FA  group demonstrated a late positive 
component but not the typical N400 effect in response to  semantic anomalies. Since 
participants always mentioned the anomalous sentences when they were debriefed, 
it is unlikely that they did not notice the semantic anomalies. It is therefore more 
plausible that in H FA  semantic anomalies were not detected immediately, as reflected
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by the reduced N400 effect, and that a delayed and more extended process was used 
to  arrive at a sentence interpretation, as indexed by the late positive component. 
In contrast, the Asperger group and control group were immediately sensitive to 
sentence context, as reflected by the N400 effect to anomalous words, followed by a 
late positive component suggesting an effortful attempt to make sense of the anoma­
lous sentence. Remarkably, the pattern we found in H FA  does not seem to be specific 
to  autism. For instance, Ditman and Kuperberg (2007) found in people with schizo­
phrenia no N400 effect but did find a late positive component for causally unrelated 
discourse scenarios relative to causally related ones. Moreover, older people showed 
a reduced N400 effect for semantic anomalies but a similar late positive component 
as young people (Günter, Jackson, &  Mulder, 1992).
The second aim of the present w ork  was to examine how high-functioning adults 
with H FA  and Asperger syndrome make use of context information when reason­
ing with conditionals. For that purpose, ERPs were recorded while participants read 
conditional reasoning problems, which were preceded by a congruent context o r a 
disabling context that contained a possible exception that could prevent people from 
drawing the conclusion.
In contrast to our previous behavioral findings, both the Asperger group and 
the H FA  group suppressed the conclusion at the same rate as the control group 
when a possible exception was provided (Pijnacker, Geurts et al., 2009). Due to  ERP 
constraints, exceptions had to be presented more explicitly in the current study 
than in the previous one, and we believe that this may have facilitated the reasoning 
process. This explanation is supported by research indicating that people with A SD  
have trouble processing implicit information (Begeer, Terwogt, Lunenburg, &  Stegge, 
2009; Dennis et al., 2001). O u r data suggest that when exceptions are sufficiently 
explicit, high-functioning adults with A SD  cease to have difficulties taking exceptions 
into account when reasoning with conditionals. For clinical practice and treatment, 
this finding underlines that it may be important to be more explicit than usual when 
communicating with people with ASD.
W h ile  there were no observable performance differences, the neural processing 
of defeasible inferences appears to  be different in high-functioning adults with autis­
tic disorder (HFA ). W hereas the Asperger group showed a similar brain response 
as the control group for the disabling condition relative to the congruent condition, 
context had no differential ERP effect in the H FA  group. W h en  the conclusion did 
not fit with the preceding context, both the Asperger group and the control group 
demonstrated a sustained negativity that started just within 250 ms after the onset 
of the final word of the conclusion. This finding suggests that defeasible reasoning is 
an immediate process. As mentioned in the introduction, the sustained negativity may 
either reflect additional processing because a default inference must be revised to
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incorporate the possible exception, or more complex, inference-driven interpretive 
processes (Pijnacker et al., in press). O u r ERP results suggest that context had no 
immediate effect in the H FA  group, in contrast to the Asperger group and the control 
group. However, by the time H FA  participants were required to make a response, 
contextual information had been taken into account, as there was a normal pattern 
of behavioral responses. This suggests that the participants with H FA  made use of 
context information, but in a less automatic and more effortful way than is the case 
in controls.
O ne limitation of the current study are the small group sizes, in particular for 
the H FA  group. W e  took effort including a homogeneous A SD  group of adults w ith ­
out intellectual disabilities, w ithout severe co-morbodity, and sufficient capacity to 
perform the task. This resulted in small sample sizes, and in consequence reduced 
the statistical power of our effects. W e  should therefore be tentative in interpret­
ing the absence of the sustained negativity and the N400 effect in adults with HFA, 
which could be possibly due to a lack of statistical power. Nonetheless, the individual 
data revealed that the patterns were consistent across participants in all groups. 
Testing with larger samples will be needed to confirm our results. Moreover, for a 
more complete understanding it is necessary to investigate how younger o r lower- 
functioning groups with A SD  process semantic anomalies and exceptions.
A  final comment is in order concerning the different patterns we found for adults 
with H FA  and Asperger syndrome. Until now, it is still a matter of debate whether 
Asperger syndrome is a variant of HFA, o r is a distinct and separate disorder (Frith, 
2004; Macintosh &  Dissanayake, 2004; Matson & W ilkins, 2007). Although the present 
findings cannot offer decisive evidence in favor of one position or the other, they 
make it clear that collapsing data across the whole A SD  group may obscure impor­
tant differences H FA  and Asperger syndrome.
In conclusion, the most striking finding in this study was that context - sentence 
context as well as reasoning context - had an immediate ERP effect in adults with 
Asperger syndrome, as in matched controls, while the H FA  group failed to  demon­
strate an immediate ERP effect, though at the behavioral level they showed a normal 
response pattern. Because sentence context had a modulating effect in a later phase, 
semantic integration is perhaps less automatic in HFA, and presumably more elabo­
rate processes are needed to arrive at a sentence interpretation. Both the sentence 
conditions and the reasoning conditions suggest that participants with H FA  made use 
of context information, but in a less automatic and more effortful way.
chapter 6
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Su m m a ry
The research described in this thesis investigated how adults with and w ithout autism 
spectrum disorders (A SD ) deal with defeasible inferences, which are inferences that 
may be cancelled in the light of extra information.We investigated two types of defea­
sible inference - scalar implicatures and conditional inferences -, and were particularly 
interested in the interpretive processes involved in these inferences. Though scalar 
implicatures and conditional inferences have in common that they are defeasible, they 
are presumably of a different nature, and our findings revealed that high-functioning 
adults with A SD  did not behave similarly on these two kinds of defeasible inference.
Defeasible inferences can be linked to the three cognitive domains that are usually 
impaired in autism: theory of mind, central coherence, and executive functions. In 
particular, scalar implicatures seem to require awareness of other people's mental 
states, like beliefs and intentions, whilst conditional inferences demand sensitivity to 
context and mental flexibility to think and interpret language. Because people with 
autism have deficits in all these domains, we expected them to experience difficulties 
understanding defeasible inferences of both types. W e  would like to  underline that 
it was not a purpose of this thesis to find evidence in favor of one of the cognitive 
accounts on autism. W e  were rather concerned with throwing some light on infer­
ences and subtle aspects of linguistic functioning in high-functioning adults with ASD, 
which is a largely unexplored area of research in autism.
Chapter 2 presented an experiment in which participants were presented with 
underinformative sentences like “ Some sparrows are birds” and “ Zebras have black 
or white stripes” . Such sentences are logically true, but pragmatically infelicitous if 
the scalar implicatures “ N o t all sparrows are birds” and “ Zebras do not have both 
black and white stripes” are derived. Previous research has shown that young chil­
dren derive fewer implicatures than adults do (e.g Noveck, 2001). That is, children are 
more likely than adults to  interpret scalar terms like some and or logically (‘literally') 
rather than pragmatically. It has been argued that to derive the pragmatic meaning of 
a scalar term, people have to  rely on a theory of mind, because one must reason that 
if the speaker meant the more informative all o r and, he would have said so. Because 
people with A SD  usually have problems with pragmatic language (for instance, they 
tend to take non-literal language like metaphors and idioms literally), and have prob­
lems with theory of mind reasoning, we expected them to have difficulty to  derive 
the pragmatic meaning of scalar terms. However, our predictions were not entirely 
borne out by the data. The results presented in Chapter 2 show that the combined 
high-functioning A SD  group (n=28) was just as likely to derive scalar implicatures as 
matched controls (n=28). However, there was a difference between participants with 
autistic disorder (HFA, n = ll)  and Asperger syndrome (n=l7). Participants with HFA 
produced more logical interpretations than participants with Asperger syndrome,
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though they did not differ significantly from controls. Moreover, in the H FA  subgroup 
the number of logical interpretations correlated with verbal intelligence: the lower 
verbal intelligence, the more logical interpretations. A  correlation of this kind was not 
found either in the Asperger group o r in the control group.
In chapter 3 we reported on a behavioral experiment that investigated how high- 
functioning adults with A SD  (n=28) deal with conditionals and suppression of condi­
tionals. This was done by making salient a possible exception which could prevent a 
conclusion from being drawn.We expected adults with A SD  to have difficulties dealing 
with such exceptions because they require mental flexibility to adjust to the context, 
which is often impaired in autism. W e  argued that conditionals may be interpreted 
as containing a marker for exceptions, for instance, “ If I turn this switch and nothing 
abnormal is the case, then the light will come on.”  As long as there is no evidence 
that there may be exceptions, people can apply a so-called closed-world assumption 
to  exceptions. That is, exceptions are considered to be not the case. However, if an 
exception becomes salient (for instance, if it is suggested that the lamp might be 
broken), then the original closed-world assumption cannot be maintained anymore. 
This may prevent people from drawing the conclusion that the light will come on. 
The important thing is that one must disregard all possible exceptions as long as 
there is no evidence thereof (i.e. apply the closed-world assumption), but adjust the 
closed-world assumption when an exception becomes salient (for a detailed descrip­
tion of the framework, see Stenning &  Van Lambalgen, 2005, 2008). W e  hypothesized 
that it is such exception-handling that is the difficult part of defeasible reasoning for 
people with ASD, which was indeed confirmed by our results. W e  found that people 
with A SD  were good at conditional reasoning, but were less sensitive to  exceptions 
that prevent a conclusion from being drawn, compared to matched controls. Because 
they were able to suppress the invited inferences affirmation of the consequent and 
denial of the antecedent when information about alternatives was provided, it was 
not defeasibility as such that was problematic for people with ASD. Finally, in contrast 
to  the findings in chapter 2, the whole A SD  group performed similarly, that is, no 
subgroups could be distinguished based on diagnosis.
Chapter 4 described a paradigm that we developed to explore the electro- 
physiological signature of defeasible inferences using event-related brain potentials 
(ERPs). W e  used a modified version of the suppression task that we employed in 
chapter 3. A  group of students (n=l8) was visually presented with modus ponens 
inferences that were preceded by a congruent or a disabling context. The disabling 
context contained a possible exception o r precondition that could prevent people 
from drawing the conclusion. Acceptance rates were indeed lower in the disabling 
condition compared to the congruent condition. Further, the ERP results yielded 
a widely distributed sustained negativity at the conclusion of the disabling condi­
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tion relative to the congruent condition, which started around 250 ms and was 
persistent throughout the entire epoch. Participants also read an additional set of 
control sentences, in which semantic congruency was manipulated in order to  elicit 
a standard N400 effect, which we indeed found. The N400 effect was followed by a 
late positive component for words that were semantically anomalous to  the prior 
sentence relative to  semantically congruent words. The observed negativity in the 
reasoning conditions differed from that of semantic anomalies at least in its morphol­
ogy and temporal profile: a peak was lacking and the effect was much more sustained. 
However, we could not conclude that the observed negativity is different from a stan­
dard N400 effect, because it had a N400-like scalp distribution, which may imply that 
the underlying neural processes are similar. W e  suggested that the observed negativ­
ity could reflect additional processing because a default inference must be revised to 
incorporate an exception. Alternatively, it could be associated with more complex, 
inference-driven interpretive processes. More importantly, regardless of the exact 
nature of the observed sustained negativity, the processing of conditional inferences 
in a disabling context seems to be more effortful than in a congruent context.
In chapter 5, we used ERPs to investigate context sensitivity in high-functioning 
adults with autistic disorder (HFA, n=6) and Asperger syndrome (n=l2) at two levels: 
at the level of sentence processing and at the level of solving reasoning problems. To 
investigate context sensitivity at sentence level, we used a standard N400 paradigm 
containing sentences that ended with a word that was either semantically congru­
ent o r incongruent, as in chapter 4. Both the adults with Asperger syndrome and 
matched controls (n=l8) showed a N400 effect, albeit that the effect in the Asperger 
group was more pronounced over the right hemisphere than in the control group. 
In contrast, in the H FA  group, sentence context did not show an immediate modu­
lation of the ERP, as the N400 effect was absent. However, the H FA  group showed 
a late positive component which was larger for semantically anomalous sentences 
than congruent sentences, as in the control and the Asperger group. For the reason­
ing problems, we applied the same ERP paradigm that we described in chapter 4. In 
contrast to our findings in chapter 3, both the Asperger group and the H FA  group 
suppressed the conclusion at the same rate as the control group when a possible 
exception was provided. W h ile  there were no observable performance differences, 
the neural processing of defeasible inferences appears to be different in adults with 
HFA.W hereas the Asperger group showed a similar sustained negativity as the control 
group for the disabling condition relative to the congruent condition, context had no 
differential ERP effect in the H FA  group.
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Conclusions
The focus of this thesis was on defeasible inference in high-functioning adults with 
ASD , that is, adults with average or above-average intelligence. If we put together the 
findings of the various experiments described in this thesis, then one of the most 
striking findings is that there was clearly a different pattern of results for the two 
kinds of diagnosis within high-functioning ASD : Asperger syndrome and autistic disor­
der (HFA ). As discussed in the previous chapters, both disorders show a large overlap 
in symptomatology, but Asperger syndrome differs from H FA  primarily in that it does 
not involve a delay in language development. The present findings suggest that, though 
basic linguistic abilities in H FA  seemed to be in the normal range in adulthood, like in 
Asperger syndrome (chapter 2), delays in early language development are associated 
with functioning in later life, at least at the level of more sophisticated linguistic and 
pragmatic functioning. Future w ork  should therefore investigate in more detail the 
connection between inference abilities and language profiles. Furthermore, it would 
be interesting to study the developmental pathways of pragmatic comprehension 
and reasoning in ASD. Finally, and most importantly, though both disorders overlap in 
symptomatology and may lie along the same spectrum, the current findings strongly 
indicate that H FA  and Asperger syndrome should not be grouped together. There­
fore, for research as well as clinical purposes, it must be taken into account that 
collapsing across high-functioning A SD  may obscure important differences between 
H FA  and Asperger syndrome.
Neural underpinnings of language and inference
The current ERP findings provide preliminary evidence that the neural processes 
underlying language understanding and inference are deviant in HFA, though perfor­
mance at the behavioral level was similar to that of matched controls. Also recent 
fMRI research indicates that, though behavior in high-functioning A SD  could be in the 
normal range, this does not necessarily imply that the underlying neural processes 
are similar. Several fMRI studies have found that in A SD  additional brain regions were 
recruited to support performance (Mason, W illiam s, Kana, Minshew, &  Just, 2008; 
Tesink et al., 2009; Wang, Lee, Sigman, &  Dapretto, 2006). For example, Tesink et 
al. (2009) found that high-functioning adults with A SD  made voice-based inferences 
about the speaker, but activated additional brain regions in the right inferior frontal 
gyrus compared to matched controls. Because there was overlap in recruited brain 
regions in the left hemisphere, the additional activation in the right hemisphere in 
A SD  seems compensatory in nature. Taken together, though performance in A SD  
could be similar to that of controls at the behavioral level, techniques like ERP and 
fMRI are good tools to  investigate whether this is a consequence of the same or 
different neural underpinnings. Future research should therefore focus on the neural
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substrates of defeasible inference in ASD, and in particular it should be investigated 
whether there are differences in neural activation between subgroups within high- 
functioning ASD. Besides, the challenge is to develop experimental materials that 
require more subtle, less explicit inferences to investigate how the ‘autistic brain' 
processes such inferences.
Finally, recent research has provided evidence of functional underconnectiv­
ity between cortical areas in autism (Courchesne &  Pierce, 2005; Just, Cherkassky, 
Keller, Kana, &  Minshew, 2007; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, &  Minshew, 2004). Since both 
language understanding and defeasible inference require integration of information 
from widespread and diverse brain regions, it is conceivable that when different corti­
cal areas are less connected, processing is more effortful. Therefore a promising line 
of research would be to explore to  what extent differences in functional connectivity 
play a role in language understanding and inference in ASD.
chapter 7
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H oofdstuk 1: Inleiding
Dit proefschrift gaat over taal en redeneren bij volwassenen met autisme. In dage­
lijkse communicatie is er veel meer nodig om taal te begrijpen dan alleen het combi­
neren van de syntactische structuur en de betekenis van de verschillende woorden 
waaruit een zin bestaat. Z o  zijn ook achtergrondkennis en inferenties nodig om te 
begrijpen w at een spreker precies bedoelt.
Neem  bijvoorbeeld de volgende situatie. Ik heb een vriend uitgenodigd om te 
komen eten rond zeven uur. Om  kwart voor zeven gaat de telefoon. Het is mijn 
vriend en hij zegt: “ Ik heb een lekke band” . Mijn vriend zou een lekke band met zijn 
fiets of met zijn auto kunnen hebben, maar omdat ik w eet dat hij geen auto heeft, 
redeneer ik dat zijn fiets een lekke band heeft. Verder bedenk ik dat als hij een 
lekke band heeft, dat hij dan waarschijnlijk later zal zijn dan afgesproken. Ik bedenk 
vervolgens dat als hij later komt, dat ik beter de oven uit kan zetten, anders brandt 
misschien de ovenschotel aan. Als mijn vriend echter daarna vertelt dat hij een bus 
zal nemen, zal ik waarschijnlijk mijn conclusie herzien dat het beter is de oven uit te 
zetten.
Zulke inferenties komen veel voor in dagelijkse communicatie en zijn het onder­
werp van dit proefschrift. Centraal staan inferenties die niet-monotoon (‘defeasible') 
zijn, dat wil zeggen, inferenties die kunnen worden herzien in het licht van nieuwe 
informatie. Onderzoek op het gebied van semantiek en pragmatiek heeft laten zien 
dat er veel verschillende soorten niet-monotone inferenties zijn. In dit proefschrift 
komen twee soorten niet-monotone inferenties aan de orde: scalaire implicaturen en 
conditionele redeneringen. In de volgende paragraaf zullen we beide soorten inferen­
ties kort uitleggen en duidelijk maken waarom we verwachtten dat mensen met een 
stoornis in het autismespectrum (ASS) moeite hebben met zulke inferenties. Daarna 
zullen we de uitkomsten van het onderzoek bespreken.
Scalaire implicaturen
Scalaire implicaturen zijn inferenties die verder gaan dan de expliciete betekenis 
van een uiting. Centraal staat hoe mensen woorden zoals sommige en of interpret­
eren. Als een spreker bijvoorbeeld zegt “ Sommige studenten zijn geslaagd voor het 
examen” , vatten we dit doorgaans op als “ N ie t alle studenten zijn geslaagd voor het 
examen” , hoewel de spreker dit niet expliciet heeft gezegd. De conclusie dat “ N iet 
alle studenten geslaagd zijn voor het examen” is een scalaire implicatuur, en is het 
gevolg van pragmatische factoren (Grice, 1975; Horn, 1972). Pragmatisch verwijst hier 
naar de impliciete veronderstelling dat als de spreker had geweten dat alle studenten 
geslaagd zouden zijn voor het examen, hij dat gezegd zou hebben. Daarom leiden we 
af dat niet alle studenten geslaagd zijn. Deze conclusie is niet-monotoon (‘defeasible'), 
want hij kan worden herzien zonder tegenstrijdigheid: “ Sommige, en misschien zelfs 
alle studenten zijn geslaagd voor het examen” .
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Conditionele redeneringen
Conditionele redeneringen zijn van het type “ Als P, dan Q ” . E r zijn vier argument- 
vormen: modus ponens (P  dus Q ), modus tollens (niet-Q, dus niet-P), bevestiging 
van de consequens (Q , dus P) en ontkenning van de antecedens (niet-P dus niet-Q). 
In de klassieke logica worden alleen modus ponens en modus tollens geldig geacht. 
Bevestiging van de consequens en ontkenning van de antecedens zijn geen geldige 
conclusies volgens de klassieke logica, maar zijn het gevolg van pragmatische proces­
sen (Geis &  Zwicky, 1971; Horn, 2000).
Het is bekend dat conditionele redeneringen niet-monotoon zijn. Verschillende 
onderzoeken hebben aangetoond dat modus ponens en modus tollens conclusies 
kunnen worden ingetrokken in het licht van extra informatie, namelijk wanneer voor­
waarden of uitzonderingen worden genoemd (Bonnefon &  Hilton, 2002; Byrne, 1989; 
Byrne, Espino, &  Santamaria, 1999; Chan & Chua, 1994; Cummins, Lubart, Alksnis, & 
Rist, 1991; Dieussaert, Schaeken, Schroyens, &  d'Ydewalle, 2000; Politzer &  Bourmaud, 
2002). De andere twee argumentvormen, bevestiging van de consequens en ontken­
ning van de antecedens, kunnen op een andere manier worden herzien, namelijk door 
het noemen van alternatieven. In alle gevallen zorgt extra informatie ervoor dat een 
conclusie w ordt herzien: de conclusie is niet-monotoon (‘defeasible').
Niet-monotone inferenties doen een beroep op de drie domeinen die vaak 
gestoord zijn in autisme: ‘theory-of-mind', centrale coherentie en executieve functies. 
M eer specifiek, scalaire implicaturen vereisen dat je kunt inschatten w at een ander 
w eet en bedoelt, terwijl conditionele inferenties vragen om contextgevoeligheid en 
mentale flexibiliteit, dat wil zeggen, taal kunnen begrijpen en kunnen denken op een 
flexibele manier. Om dat mensen met autisme problemen hebben op al deze vlakken, 
verwachtten wij dat ze moeite zouden hebben met niet-monotone inferenties.
In dit proefschrift hebben we alleen hoogfunctionerende volwassenen met een 
stoornis in het autismespectrum (ASS) onderzocht, dat wil zeggen volwassenen 
met een gemiddelde of bovengemiddelde intelligentie. Binnen het autismespectrum 
hebben we gekeken naar volwassenen met een diagnose autistische stoornis (HFA ) 
en stoornis van Asperger. Deze subtypes vertonen een grote overlap in kenmerken, 
maar de stoornis van Asperger verschilt van H FA  voornamelijk in dat er geen sprake 
is van een vertraging in de taalontwikkeling.
H oofdstuk  2: Sca la ire  im plicaturen
In hoofdstuk 2 beschrijven we een gedragsexperiment waarin de deelnemers onder- 
informatieve zinnen kregen te lezen zoals “ Sommige mussen zijn vogels” en Zebra's 
hebben zwarte of w itte strepen” . Zulke zinnen zijn logisch gezien waar, maar pragma­
tisch onwaar als de scalaire implicaturen “ N iet alle mussen zijn vogels” en “ Zebra's 
hebben geen zwarte én witte strepen” worden afgeleid. Eerder onderzoek heeft
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aangetoond dat jonge kinderen minder scalaire implicaturen afleiden dan volwas­
senen (o.a. Noveck, 2001). Dat wil zeggen, kinderen zijn meer geneigd om scalaire 
woorden als sommige en of logisch (‘letterlijk') op te vatten in plaats van pragma­
tisch, zoals volwassenen doorgaans doen. O ve r het algemeen w ordt gedacht dat de 
pragmatische betekenis van een scalaire term  vraagt om theory-of-mind denken. Je 
moet namelijk redeneren dat als de spreker had geweten dat er sprake is van alle, hij 
dat dan gezegd zou hebben in plaats van het minder informatieve sommige. Omdat 
mensen met een stoornis in het autismespectrum (ASS) doorgaans veel problemen 
hebben met pragmatische taal, (ze nemen bijvoorbeeld figuurlijk taalgebruik zoals 
metaforen en idiomen vaak letterlijk), en met theory-of-mind denken, verwachtten 
wij dat ze moeite zouden hebben met het afleiden van de pragmatische betekenis van 
scalaire uitdrukkingen.
Onze voorspellingen kwamen niet helemaal uit. De resultaten in hoofdstuk 2 
laten zien dat de gecombineerde groep van hoogfunctionerende volwassenen met 
ASS (n=28) evenveel scalaire implicaturen afleidden als de controlegroep (n=28). Er 
was echter een verschil tussen de deelnemers met een diagnose autistische stoornis 
(HFA, n = ll)  en een diagnose stoornis van Asperger (n=l7). Deelnemers met HFA 
hadden meer logische interpretaties dan deelnemers met de stoornis van Asperger, 
hoewel ze niet significant verschilden van de controlegroep. Verder bleek er in HFA 
een verband te zijn tussen verbale intelligentie en het aantal logische interpretaties: 
hoe lager de verbale intelligentie, hoe meer logische interpretaties. Een dergelijk 
verband was niet aanwezig in de Aspergergroep en de controlegroep.
H oofdstuk  3: C ond itione le  redeneringen
In hoofdstuk 3 beschrijven we een gedragsexperiment waarin we onderzochten 
hoe hoogfunctionerende volwassenen met ASS (n=28) redeneren met conditionele 
zinnen en of ze een conclusie kunnen herzien wanneer extra informatie over moge­
lijke uitzonderingen of alternatieven w ordt gegeven. W ij  verwachtten dat volwas­
senen met ASS moeite zouden hebben met het meenemen van uitzonderingen in een 
redenering, omdat uitzonderingen een zekere mentale flexibiliteit vereisen, w at juist 
vaak problematisch is in autisme. W ij  stelden dat een conditionele zin een ‘marker' 
voor uitzonderingen kan bevatten, bijvoorbeeld: “ Als ik de schakelaar van de lamp 
indruk en er is niets abnormaals aan de hand, dan zal het licht aangaan” . Zolang er geen 
aanwijzingen zijn dat er sprake is van uitzonderingen, kun je een zogenoemde geslo- 
ten-wereld veronderstelling op uitzonderingen toepassen: je gaat ervan uit dat uitzon­
deringen niet het geval zijn zolang er geen aanwijzingen voor zijn. Als er echter een 
uitzondering bekend w ordt (bijvoorbeeld een kapotte lamp), dan gaat de oorspron­
kelijke gesloten-wereld veronderstelling niet langer op. Als dit het geval is, dan zal 
je waarschijnlijk de conclusie herzien dat de lamp gaat branden als je de schakelaar
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indrukt. Het belangrijkste is dat je alle mogelijke uitzonderingen moet negeren zolang 
er geen bewijs voor is (d.w.z. het toepassen van de gesloten-wereld veronderstelling), 
maar dat je gesloten-wereld veronderstelling moet loslaten wanneer een uitzonder­
ing evident w ordt (zie Stenning &  Van Lambalgen, 2005, 2008).
W ij  voorspelden dat voor mensen met ASS het omgaan met uitzonderingen het 
moeilijke gedeelte is van niet-monotoon redeneren. D it werd inderdaad bevestigd 
door de resultaten. W ij  vonden dat mensen met ASS goed waren in conditionele 
redeneringen, maar meer moeite hadden met het meenemen van uitzonderingen in 
een redenering dan de controlegroep. Om dat de deelnemers met ASS wel informatie 
over alternatieven meenamen in een redenering, was het niet non-monotonie als 
zodanig dat een probleem was, maar vooral het flexibel omgaan met de gesloten- 
wereld veronderstelling. Tenslotte, in tegenstelling to t de bevindingen in hoofdstuk 2, 
lieten de subgroepen binnen ASS eenzelfde patroon van resultaten zien.
H oofdstuk  4: Redeneren  m et uitzonderingen
Hoofdstuk 4 beschrijft een paradigma dat we hebben ontwikkeld om het elektrofy­
siologische patroon van niet-monotone inferenties te onderzoeken met behulp van 
ERP (‘event-related brain potentials'). ERPs geven inzicht in het tijdsverloop van 
cognitieve processen. W ij  gebruikten hiervoor een aangepaste versie van de taak uit 
hoofdstuk 3. Een groep van studenten (n=l8) kreeg modus ponens redeneringen te 
lezen die werden voorafgegaan door een congruente of een incongruente context. 
De incongruente context bevatte een mogelijke uitzondering of voorwaarde die kon 
voorkomen dat de deelnemers de conclusie nog langer zouden trekken. H et bleek 
dat de deelnemers inderdaad minder vaak de conclusie trokken wanneer er een 
incongruente context was in vergelijking to t een congruente context. Verder lieten 
de ERP-resultaten een aanhoudende negativiteit zien voor de incongruente condi­
tie ten opzichte van de congruente conditie. Deze negativiteit was zichtbaar vanaf 
250 ms na het laatste woord van de conclusie en bleef aanwezig to t het einde van 
het segment. Deelnemers kregen ook een reeks controlezinnen te lezen, waarin 
semantische congruentie werd gemanipuleerd om een standaard N400-effect uit te 
lokken (bijvoorbeeld “ De bergbeklimmers bereikten de top van de tulp / berg” ), 
welke inderdaad werd gevonden.
De negativiteit die we vonden in de redeneercondities verschilde van de nega­
tiviteit in de semantische schendingen, althans in vorm  en tijdsverloop: er ontbrak 
een piek en het effect hield veel langer aan. W e  konden echter niet concluderen 
dat de negativiteit in de redeneercondities verschillend is van een standaard N400- 
effect, omdat beide effecten eenzelfde verdeling over de schedel hadden. D it zou 
kunnen betekenen dat aan niet-monotone inferenties en semantische schendingen 
dezelfde neurale processen ten grondslag liggen. W e  denken dat de negativiteit in
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de redeneercondities duidt op extra verwerking die nodig is om een inferentie te 
herzien vanwege een uitzondering. Een alternatieve verklaring is dat de aanhoudende 
negativiteit samenhangt met complexe, inferentie-gedreven interpretatieve proces­
sen. W a t  belangrijker is, ongeacht de precieze aard van de aanhoudende negativiteit, 
lijkt de verwerking van conditionele redeneringen in een incongruente context meer 
moeite te kosten dan in een congruente context.
H oofdstuk  5: Contextgevoeligheid  in A S S
In hoofdstuk 5, gebruikten we ERPs om contextgevoeligheid in hoogfunctionerende 
volwassenen met een autistische stoornis (HFA, n=6) en de stoornis van Asperger 
(n=l2) te onderzoeken op twee niveaus: op het niveau van de zin en op het niveau 
van redeneerproblemen. O m  contextgevoeligheid op zinsniveau te onderzoeken, 
gebruikten we een standaard N400-paradigma met zinnen die eindigden met een 
woord dat ofwel semantisch congruent ofwel incongruent was, zoals in hoofdstuk 4. 
Zow el de volwassenen met de stoornis van Asperger als de controles (n=l8) lieten 
een standaard N400-effect zien. In de HFA-groep moduleerde context niet onmiddel­
lijk het ERP-patroon: een N400-effect was afwezig. De HFA-groep liet echter wel een 
late positiviteit zien voor semantisch incongruente zinnen in vergelijking to t congru­
ente zinnen, zoals ook de controlegroep en de Aspergergroep lieten zien na het 
N400-effect.
Voor de redeneerproblemen gebruikten we hetzelfde ERP-paradigma zoals 
beschreven in hoofdstuk 4. In tegenstelling to t onze bevindingen in hoofdstuk 3, 
herzagen zowel de Aspergergroep als de HFA-groep de conclusie even vaak als de 
controlegroep wanneer een mogelijke uitzondering werd gegeven. Hoewel er geen 
significante verschillen waren in prestaties tussen de groepen, lijkt de neurale verwerk­
ing van niet-monotone inferenties anders te zijn bij volwassenen met HFA. Terwijl 
de Aspergergroep eenzelfde aanhoudende negativiteit liet zien als de controlegroep 
voor de incongruente redeneerconditie ten opzichte van de congruente conditie, had 
context geen modulerend ERP-effect in de HFA-groep.
H oofdstuk  6: Conclusies
D it proefschrift omvat onderzoek naar niet-monotone (‘defeasible') inferenties in 
hoogfunctionerende volwassenen met ASS, dat wil zeggen volwassenen met een 
gemiddelde of bovengemiddelde intelligentie. Als we de bevindingen van de verschil­
lende experimenten in dit proefschrift naast elkaar leggen, dan is een van de meest 
opvallende bevindingen dat er sprake was van een duidelijk verschillend patroon 
van resultaten voor de twee soorten diagnoses binnen hoogfunctionerend ASS: de 
stoornis van Asperger en autistische stoornis (HFA). Zoals besproken in het proef­
schrift, vertonen beide stoornissen een grote overlap in symptomatologie, maar
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verschilt de stoornis van Asperger van H FA  voornamelijk in dat er geen sprake is 
van een vertraging in de taalontwikkeling. De huidige bevindingen suggereren dat - 
hoewel de basale taalcapaciteiten bij volwassenen met H FA  in het normale bereik 
lijken te liggen, net als bij volwassenen met de stoornis van Asperger (hoofdstuk 2) 
-, vroege taalontwikkeling in verband kan worden gebracht met het functioneren in 
het latere leven, ten minste op het niveau van subtiel, complex linguïstisch en prag­
matisch functioneren. Onderzoek in de toekomst zou daarom in meer detail moeten 
onderzoeken hoe (pragmatische) inferenties en taalprofielen met elkaar samenhan­
gen. Bovendien zou het interessant zijn om het ontwikkelingstraject van redeneren 
en pragmatisch taalbegrip in ASS te onderzoeken. Ten slotte, en nog belangrijker, 
hoewel beide stoornissen overlappen in symptomatologie en in hetzelfde spectrum 
liggen, duiden de huidige bevindingen er op dat H FA  en de stoornis van Asperger niet 
als één groep gezien moet worden. Het is daarom belangrijk voor zowel onderzoek 
als klinische doeleinden dat we ons ervan bewust zijn dat als we H FA  en de stoornis 
van Asperger onder een noemer scharen, belangrijke verschillen tussen H FA  en de 
stoornis van Asperger over het hoofd kunnen worden gezien.
Neurale onderbouwing van taal en inferentie
De huidige ERP bevindingen bieden voorlopige evidentie dat de neurale proces­
sen van taalverwerking en inferentie afwijkend zijn in HFA, hoewel de prestaties op 
gedragsniveau gelijk waren aan die van controles. O o k  recent fMRI-onderzoek heeft 
laten zien mensen met ASS op gedragsniveau dezelfde prestaties kunnen laten zien als 
de controles, maar dat deze prestaties het gevolg kunnen zijn van afwijkende neurale 
processen (Mason, W illiams, Kana, Minshew, &  Just, 2008; Tesink ea., 2009; Wang, Lee, 
Sigman, &  Dapretto , 2006). Tesink e.a. (2009) vond bijvoorbeeld dat volwassenen 
met ASS inferenties kunnen maken op basis van de stem van een spreker, maar dat 
in de hersenen extra gebieden actief werden in de rechter inferieure frontale gyrus 
vergeleken met controles. Om dat er overlap was in hersenactiviteit in de linkerhe- 
misfeer, lijkt de extra activiteit in de rechterhemisfeer in ASS vooral compenserend 
van aard. Kortom, hoewel de prestaties in ASS vergelijkbaar kunnen zijn met die van 
controles op gedragsniveau, zijn technieken als ERP en fMRI goede instrumenten om 
te onderzoeken of dit een gevolg is van dezelfde of verschillende neurale proces­
sen. Toekomstig onderzoek moet zich daarom richten op de neurale substraten van 
‘defeasible' inferenties in ASS, en met name of er verschillen zijn in neurale activiteit 
tussen de subtypen binnen hoogfunctionerend autisme. Overigens is het de uitdag­
ing om experimentele materialen te ontwikkelen die subtielere, minder expliciete 
conclusies vereisen om te onderzoeken hoe het ‘autistische brein' zulke inferenties 
verwerkt. Tenslotte, recent onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat er in autisme sprake 
is van functionele onderconnectiviteit tussen corticale gebieden (Courchesne &
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Pierce, 2005; Just, Cherkassky, Keller, Kana, &  Minshew, 2007, Just, Cherkassky, Keller, 
&  Minshew, 2004). Om dat zowel het begrijpen van taal als ‘defeasible' inferenties 
integratie van informatie uit verschillende hersengebieden vereist, is het denkbaar 
dat, wanneer deze gebieden zijn minder goed met elkaar verbonden zijn, verwerk­
ing meer moeite kost. Het is daarom een veelbelovende lijn van onderzoek om te 
verkennen in welke mate functionele connectiviteit een rol speelt in taalbegrip en 
inferenties in ASS.
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134 A ppendix color figures
A. Conclusion (sustained negativity)
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B. Control conditions (N400 effect)
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Figure 4.5 Scalp distribution of the sustained negativity at the conclusion in the reasoning 
conditions (A), and of the N400 effect in the control conditions (B). Scalp 
distributions are based on mean amplitude differences in 4 consecutive time 
intervals of 250 ms length. Scale values are in |j V
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Figure 5.3 The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between the 
ERPs evoked by the incongruent linguistic condition relative to the congruent 
linguistic condition time-locked to the sentence-final word, in the latency 
windows 250 - 500 ms and 600 - 900 ms.
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Figure 5.8 The topographical distributions of the mean amplitude difference between the 
ERPs evoked by the disabling reasoning condition relative to the congruent 
reasoning condition time-locked to the onset of the final word of the conclusion, 
in the latency windows 250 - 500 ms and 600 - 900 ms.


